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Abstract
This paper seeks to evaluate the evolution and future of Indigenous rights in extractive industry
on a global scale and uses the Arctic both to explore the complexity of these rights and to
provide paths forward in advancing Indigenous self-determination. Indigenous rights lack a
strong international foundation and are often dependent upon local and domestic regimes, yet
this reality is currently shifting. The state of extraction internationally, particularly in the Arctic,
is also facing major uncertainty in the coming decades as demand continues to rise. Indigenous
rights and the rules governing extractive industry intersect because much of the world’s
remaining mineral resources are on or near Indigenous territories and Indigenous communities
are disproportionately impacted by the environmental degradation and socio-cultural
consequences of extractive development. The Arctic is arguably the most important setting for
the world’s future resource needs and is also home to many Indigenous peoples who operate in
complex legal, political, and social webs. This paper argues that as a result of these dynamics,
the Arctic offers opportunities to advance forms of non-traditional sovereignty and to promote
recognition of Indigenous self-determination through diffusion and international norm
development. This paper proposes a multi-faceted approach to further promote Indigenous rights
on the international level which involves using the Arctic Council as a platform for diffusion, the
US ratification of UNDRIP, the creation of standards and guidelines for transnational
corporations in development projects, and investment in Indigenous communities to support
Indigenous empowerment, advocacy, and voices.
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The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) is a plot of land on the North Slope of Alaska
covering nearly 10 million acres.1 The Gwich’in peoples have lived and relied on the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge and the surrounding lands for thousands of years. Their culture revolves
around this sacred land and their relationship with the many other species that live there, in
particular the Porcupine Caribou Herd. The caribou herd is an integral part of the Gwich’in
peoples’ existence, identity, and path towards sovereignty, impacting their subsistence lifestyle and
self-sufficiency in addition to their Indigenous cultural traditions. The Gwich’in call the Coastal
Plain “Iizhik Gwats’an Gwandaii Goodlit,” or “The Sacred Place Where Life Begins.” 2 There are
fifteen Gwich’in villages and nearly nine thousand Gwich’in people living by the migratory path of
the caribou herd.3
For four decades, the oil and gas industry has threatened this sacred relationship and the
survival of the Gwich’in peoples by attempting to gain access to the resources in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge, particularly along the Coastal Plain.4 Oil and gas development in
ANWR, including seismic testing and exploration, would be detrimental to the ecosystem of the
entire refuge, but even more, the Coastal Plain is the calving grounds for the Porcupine Caribou
herd and the “biological heart” of the Refuge, thus an especially sacred and significant site. 5 In
their role as stewards and protectors of the land, the Gwich’in Nation has been fighting this
attempted exploitation in a series of legal and political battles which pull from federal policies
within the US and the policies of the state of Alaska, international law in the Arctic, and
Indigenous governance, rights, and ways of life, among other sources.
***
The case of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge acts as a posterchild for Indigenous rights
in the Arctic and beyond. A decades long battle of law, policy, culture, economics, and more,
ANWR has demonstrated the complexity of Indigenous rights within extractive industry and
highlights themes that continually resurface both the Arctic and on a global level. This paper will
explore these discussions—over Indigenous rights in extractive industry—and use ANWR, and
other similar cases in the Arctic, to contextualize Indigenous rights within the intersecting
dimensions of local, regional, national, and international policy and the relevant political,
environmental, and legal frameworks.
The status of Indigenous rights—in a legal and political context—is evolving and
dynamic as these rights are often dependent on the legal regime, level of governance, or
jurisdictional system in which they are located. Indigenous rights on an international level have
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traditionally lacked a strong legal foundation and implementation mechanisms on which to
expand protections and thus it has commonly been a struggle to make arguments for selfdetermination and sovereignty. Extraction has played an important role in this discussion of
Indigenous rights, specifically land and resource rights, and this relevance is growing due to the
fact that the large proportions of our remaining mineral resources are on or near Indigenous
territories and the demand for these resources will continue to rise in the future, particularly as
we see non-western nations growing and increasing industry rapidly.6
This struggle is clearly exemplified in the Arctic and thus it serves as an effective setting
to discuss these issues in detail. In the Arctic, Indigenous rights are at the intersection of the
many legal and political questions and controversies—these debates surround resource
extraction, shipping routes, and the changing climate, which all involve questions about the
relationship between power and sovereignty. By using the Arctic as a regional focus to examine
the evolving body of international norms on Indigenous rights, particularly in extraction, this
paper will evaluate the path forward and make recommendations for their further development.
The paper will address a series of questions. How do legal norms regarding Indigenous
rights (both substantive and procedural) develop and evolve over time? How are Indigenous
legal rights evolving within the multilevel governance structures developing in the Arctic,
specifically in response to pressures created by extractive resource industries? What direction
forward has the greatest potential to enhance this process—ie. working through the struggles
inherent to Indigenous legal rights and advancing the process of clarifying, codifying, and
solidifying Indigenous legal rights across various levels of governance to an international level?
***
First, it is important to briefly introduce the Arctic, as it will act as the background setting
for the rest of the paper. Upon hearing the word ‘Arctic,’ most people imagine ice, glaciers, polar
bears, and white emptiness. We have vague notions of icy and expansive landscapes and seldom
think of people and industry. These images are forefront in our minds, yet if asked, I think most
people would likely not be able to define what the Arctic is. The public’s inability to define the
Arctic is not simply due to lack of education, but is also the result of widespread disagreement
about what the Arctic is, or more precisely, what the boundaries of the Arctic are. The most
common delineation is everything above the 66° 32 minutes north polar circle, in other words the
line marking where, for at least one day a year, the sun does not rise nor set.7 This is the definition
used by the Arctic Council—the primary governance body in region which will be discussed later
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in this chapter. However, many people argue that as this definition ignores climatological
stratifications and is less relevant than a definition based on tree line or long-term temperature
(10°C isotherm in July).8 These climatological definitions, while arguably more relevant for both
scientific research, communities, and culture, are less precise and change each year which make
them difficult to apply in a political or legal sense.
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to understand the cultural and social
implications of the climatological Arctic definitionsa, but we must operate under the 66° 32
minutes north definition because it defines the Arctic states who then drive the political, economic,
and governmental structure of the region. These conflicting boundaries and ‘Arctic definitions’
impact politics and create controversy of over jurisdiction, sovereignty, and power, particularly for
Indigenous groups. The next chapter will explore these issues on the regional and global scale,
more closely analyzing how the international nature of the region is impacted by and impacts
Indigenous rights and issues.
There are eight recognized Arctic states—the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway,
Finland, Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark/Greenland,9 each with its own Arctic priorities and
concerns. Each nation operates independently and in various bilateral and multilateral forums—the
most important being the Arctic Council, which will be discussed further in chapter three.10
***
Next, it is necessary to situate these questions in literature, specifically discussing theories
in international law and international relations surrounding how law develops, transforms, and
impacts state behavior. Interdisciplinary research between the fields of international law and
international relations makes clear the inherent interrelatedness of the two fields, although this
interdependence has only recently been recognized. These contemporary theorists now
acknowledge the need to bring together insight from international law and international relations
and put a strong emphasis on the role of norms in this interdisciplinary work. In order to fully
understand their respective fields, these theorists discuss the three separate, but related processes
of international norm creation, implementation, and evolution.11
Traditional international legal approaches to international norm development emphasize
the role of the state in a structurally static and decentralized world shaped by state interest and
power hierarchies.12 The focus is on state practice and independent action, often ignoring the role
of outside forces in influencing state behavior in creating norms. In this traditional framework,
a

For example, living in a location that is treeless or has fewer hours of sunlight impacts industrial potential, energy
needs, and subsistence access. Thus, Arctic identity is heavily impacted by climatological factors.
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there is also a strict definition of sovereignty—states possessing full control over a defined
territory (ie. control over land, people, resources, all affairs).
Recently there have been a number of interdisciplinary approaches that emphasize a
more holistic and complex framework of international norm development. These researchers
argue that there are various pathways for legal development and various levels at which law and
norms operate. According to Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood (1998), this reflects the need to
embrace ‘international governance’ as an alternative to traditional notions of ‘international
government’— with international governance defined as “the formal and informal bundles of
rules, roles, and relationships that define and regulate the social practices of state and nonstate
actors in international affairs.”13 It is also important to note that there are two main categories
oflaw that are both distinctive and important to this paper—hard law, which refers to formally
adopted legal norms, often in the form of treaty-law, and soft law, which refers to non-binding
rules and instruments that still impact customary state practices and other principles of law, and
relevant norms that still have a significant influence on the negotiation, interpretation, and
application of rights.14 In Slaughter’s theory of ‘international governance,’ soft law is
emphasized over ‘hard law” in order to acknowledge the difficulties of promulgating and
enforcing law compared to generating norms that gradually and imperfectly “promote social
change.”15 In this paper, the use of ‘norms’ will refer to both hard and soft law.
It is also critical to complicate our traditional understanding sovereignty in order more
fully appreciate the various actors and forces at play in the process of norm development. Karen
Liftin describes a more liberal framework of sovereignty in aggregate parts—primarily grouped
into dimensions of authority, control, legitimacy—that are interrelated and interact with one
another but are also distinguishable.16 While the specific components of Liftin’s theory on
sovereignty will become relevant later in the paper, the idea of a disaggregated, complex, and
fluid concept of sovereignty is critical to a more holistic perspective on normative development.
This perspective is especially important in global ecopolitics, particularly in relation to the
development of Indigenous legal rights within this framework.
Beyond this general approach embracing ‘international governance,’ there are number of
different theories in the literature discussing how international legal norms develop. As noted,
traditional approaches of norm creation emphasize the influence of the state and state-centric
power policies. Alternatively, liberal IR theory assumes that “individuals and groups operating in
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domestic and transnational society are the primary actors in international relations.”17 Similarly,
liberal agency theorists argue that the traditional “concept of a domain of unitary and
functionally identical rational state actors interacting above the level of the state” is deeply
flawed.18 Rather, international relations should be characterized as “a function of state-society
relations” where the state acts “as an agent of social actors.”19 Relatedly, Kingsbury argues that
in this liberal ‘state as agent’ framework, the state is “responding to individuals and groups in
domestic and transnational society.”20 Slaughter’s model of the disaggregated state expands on
this idea of state-society relations to argue that there are “distinct governmental institutions
acting quasi-autonomously in the international system,” rather than isolated state actors—and
thus norm creation is influenced by a multitude of forces.21
Even more, regime theorists argue that while formal legal rules (treaties and conventions)
adopted by states based on their perception of state interests do have a role, international regimes
and institutions also have an impact on state behavior in the norm creation process. 22 Slaughter,
Tulumello, and Wood, expand on this discussion of institutions and states with the concept of
‘embedded nationalism’—which is “a focus on the domestic origins of international institutions,”
in order to strengthen the “formal and informal links between international and domestic
institutions”—which then situates norm creation within this integrated domestic and international
stage.23 These frameworks also influenced the development of constructivist theory which places
ideas as the primary factor influencing “the behavior of states and other international actors”
compared to the other material forces emphasized in traditional scholarship.24 Each of these
theories proposes a more complex version of norm creation, critiquing traditional theories on
both the structure and influence of the state in order to recognize the multitude of actors in norm
creation processes.
Understanding that norm creation and state practice are impacted by a number of
complex factors, it is important to recognize the argument that law is an important “explanatory
factor in the analysis of state behavior in the international system,” as well as acknowledge that
the greater proliferation of more highly legalized (or judicialized or constitutionalized) formal
institutions for global cooperation in the late 20th century have largely influenced the foundation
of this argument.25
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Contemporary theories also offer a more complex analysis of how norms are
implemented and enforced. To start, it is important to acknowledge that states and governments
do “provide formal regulatory authority” and thus are generally recognized as crucial
mechanisms in implementing and enforcing international legal norms.26 Slaughter recognizes the
role of state enforcement capabilities and emphasizes the role of national courts, government
agencies, and legislators, in applying and shaping international law. She argues that
contemporary theorists need to expand their conception of transnational law to include “domestic
law regulating individual-individual and individual-state relations” and to recognize the
significance of “voluntary codes of conduct adopted by corporate and other private actors, as
well as emerging bodies of transgovernmental law.”27 She is referencing theories on the
transnational legal process, a liberal approach to norm implementation that argues that
compliance with international rules cannot be fully explained without recognizing “the process
of internalization of international legal norms in the internal value sets of domestic legal
systems.”28 The transnational legal process will be discussed more in relation to norm
development, but the key idea for norm implementation is that there are various factors
influencing actual state behavior and thus impacting the implementation of norms and likelihood
of enforcement at both a domestic and international level.
The process of norm evolution over time is closely related to norm creation and
implementation and has a direct impact on both—and there are numerous theories within the
literature that frame how legal norms evolve on multiple levels. The theory of ‘transnational
legal process’ focuses on transnational processes involving a multitude of governmental and nongovernmental actors, and domestic and international legal institutions, to build a theory of
‘internalization’—a process where norm evolution “occurs through a complex process of
repeated interaction, norm enunciation, and interpretation, which occurs in…varied contexts.”29
Koh sees this process of internalization as “constitutive”—meaning that “each instance of
interaction and norm interpretation generates a legal rule which will guide future transnational
interactions between parties,” which will then be further internalized until the interests and even
identities of the parties are ‘reconstituted’ and shaped to support these values and overarching
compliance.30 Thus, Koh’s theory illustrates how a multitude of actors and steps impact the
evolution development of law, particularly within a transnational context.
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The theory of ‘transnational legal flow’ is closely related to the concept of ‘diffusion’—
developed by Gilardi and defined as a “consequence of interdependence” or rather, how the
international context and “the ideas, norms, and policies displayed or even promoted by other
countries and international organizations” influence the decisions of another country.31
Relatedly, Liftin’s multidimensional conceptualization of sovereignty argues that within norm
development, there can be ‘sovereignty bargains’—compromised sovereignty and cooperation—
which can permit greater involvement of non-state actors and use of non-state processes of norm
generation.32 These sovereignty bargains thus broaden the framework of relevant actors and the
pathways that are involved in the development and evolution of international law on multi-levels.
Ovodenko and Keohane apply this concept of diffusion to institutions, defining diffusion
as how “institutional characteristics spread to international institutions from a point of innovation
to points of potential adoption.”33 They argue that diffusion can “operate across issue-areas,
levels of governance, and groups of governments”—providing five different pathways of
diffusion that illustrate vertical and horizontal movement.34 They also argue that there are a
number of conditions that impact the likelihood of diffusion occurring—namely, “problem
similarity” and “record of effectiveness”—while recognizing that the politics of private/state
interests and power may also impact processes of diffusion.35 Regime theorists similarly argue
that as regimes and institutions impact state behavior they generate forces that promote “patterns
of international cooperation” beyond traditional realist understandings.36 Slaughter, Tulumello,
and Wood’s expansion on this discussion of institutions and states with the concept of
‘embedded nationalism’ is also applicable to the process of norm evolution by blurring the
distinctions between international and domestic law and thus blurring the influential factors in
the process.37
In a slightly different approach, Byers suggests that there are limits on the degree to
which states control the development of law, thus finding parallels in the theories mentioned
earlier that highlight the role and power of non-state actors in international relations. He argues
that legal rules “are not generally subject to change solely in response to fluctuations in the
immediate interests of states” because customary rule-creating processes “give rules a legal
specificity that enables them to shape future behavior through a sense of obligation” which then
constrains and modifies state power.”38
These theories serve to enrich our understanding of the process of norm development
andprovide a more flexible and dynamic world of international and law and international
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relations than the traditional literature presents. They offer important insight into the
development of Indigenous rights and environmental and human rights law which will be
critical in the analysis of potential paths forward for the advancement of Indigenous rights.
***
The first chapter of the paper analyzes the context and evolving legal foundation for
Indigenous legal rights at an international level. This discussion primarily uses international
caselaw and international declarations to set the framework for a contemporary discussion of
Indigenous rights in international law. This chapter focuses largely on foundational cases
heard by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IAHCR) and on the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal
People from the International Labor Organization (ILO C169). It also includes discussion of
some of thecurrent debates regarding the content of Indigenous rights (ex. the right to free,
prior, and informed consent (FPIC) vs. meaningful consultation).
The second chapter of the paper explores specific case studies in Arctic nations to
reveal the various routes and mechanisms by which Indigenous peoples exercise selfdetermination and how the structural, political, and socio-cultural dynamics of each Arctic
nation serve to diminish and/or support those efforts. In developing each case study, this
chapter will highlight various national laws developed within key Arctic nations—such as the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in the United States (relevant to ANWR) and the
Nunavut Land Claim Agreement in Canada. This chapter also explores some of the
contemporary legal and political debates surrounding state jurisdiction, the future of the power
structures in the Arctic, and other conflicting priorities in the Arctic, in order to understand
their implications for evolving Indigenous rights.
The third chapter broadens the scope to explore Indigenous rights in the Arctic at the
regional and international levels. These include both cooperative multilateral institutions—like
the Arctic Council, the UN, and NATO—and the legal regimes governing them—such as the law
of the sea emerging in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and the 2017 Polar Code which was
adopted and developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This chapter will
examine the dynamics of Indigenous groups as Permanent Observers on the Arctic Council and
the role of Working Groups of the Council in the advancement and suppression of Indigenous
rights and voices, in addition to discussing the mechanisms for implementation associated with
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the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
The final chapter goes beyond the current literature and analyzes policies proposed to
enhance Indigenous rights in the Arctic, concluding with suggestions on how to promote the
international development of Indigenous rights. The paper attempts to utilize the frameworks
noted above to not only highlight a potential route in the advancement of international
Indigenous rights and self-determination, but also to discuss how these rights and pathways
can be integrated into the range of legal regimes evolving in the Arctic. It explores how
evolving climate law and contemporary climate litigation, including cases involving
Indigenous rights in the Arctic, can contribute to the development of Indigenous rights by
integrating environmentaland human rights concerns.
***
Before beginning this paper, I want to acknowledge my own identity as a white
author and student. In writing this paper my intentions are to support the advancement and
protection of Indigenous rights, and in no ways do I intend to assume authority or expertise
in this arena. I recognize that crucial to the concept of self-determination is the centering of
Indigenous voices and experiences and I hope that I am able to do that in this paper by
referencing Indigenous scholars, advocates, and experts and demonstrating the awareness to
sit back, listen, and learn what rights and self-determination mean from the perspective of
Indigenous people and communities.
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Chapter 1
The History and Context of Indigenous Rights in International Law
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This chapter will analyze the context and evolving legal foundation for Indigenous rights at
an international level. It will first discuss the historical background of Indigenous rights—
starting from the period of colonization and working through time to set the stage for an analysis
of the foundation of contemporary rights. This discussion will cover major milestones in the
developmental process, ranging from early treaties between Indigenous nations and European
colonizers and the governance systems of settler colonialism to the role of UNDRIP and ILO
169. The chapter will also include analysis of what drove this growth in Indigenous rights based
on the historical narrative and will provide evidence to support the argument that three main
processes have contributed to the advancement of Indigenous rights. These three pieces are the
favorable interpretation of existing international law—namely human rights law, the formation
of new international legal instruments that are specifically focused on Indigenous rights and
issues, and successful litigation in international courts. The chapter will conclude with a more
thorough discussion of the content of Indigenous rights and provide a legal framework for the
rest of the paper in order to understand the meaning and purpose behind self-determination.
In framing this discussion of legal rights and Indigenous history, it is important to
acknowledge the complexities of applying and utilizing international law in the context of
Indigenous rights. As Carpenter and Riley state, “historically, there have been debates about
whether international law justifies Indigenous conquest or guarantees Indigenous rights,” yet, “in
contemporary times, wherein tribal people are increasingly asserting their collective autonomy in
governance, culture, and economic matters, many Indigenous peoples have coalesced around the
use of human rights law as an instrument of decolonization and self-determination.”1 The role of
Indigenous people in the evolution of human rights and environmental law will be developed
more fully later; the current focus is on the recognition that, while international law and
governance have historically been used as a tool to oppress Indigenous people, international legal
mechanisms are now recognized as valuable in the advancement of Indigenous rights.

Colonization, the Law of Nations, and the Early Treaty System
The historical background of Indigenous rights in international law began around the 1400s
with the advent of colonization and increase in world travel. International law developed as a
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response to this increased contact—they needed systems of governance to guide these early
encounters. This law evolved as the natures of colonization and interactions with Indigenous
peoples changed and it was this eventual system that guided the development of colonization in
the Arctic and thus the state of Indigenous rights within international law in the region.
In the early stages of colonization in the 15th and 16th centuries, “colonizers and Indigenous
peoples acted as separate sovereigns, governed by international law.”2 As Portuguese, Spanish,
French, British, and other European powers sought to explore the globe and discover new trade
routes, they depended on Indigenous peoples “in matters of trade, passage, and security.” 3
Despite this dynamic, European colonizers made claims to sovereignty in the ‘New World’ and
there was debate over how to legally and morally justify their colonialist conquests and brutal
treatment of Indigenous peoples. 4 Christianity and divine purpose drove much of this
conversation and provided the foundation for legal and moral justification, although generally,
“international law provided European powers with practices and doctrines that both legitimated
and limited Indigenous conquest and colonization.” 5
The Spanish encomienda system exemplified this framing—after the Pope granted
diplomatic, governance, and trade authority over Indigenous peoples to Spain and Portugal,
representatives from the Spanish government granted conquistadores, soldiers, and officials
control and sovereignty over Indian land and labor in the Americas and Caribbean. 6 In other
words, the Spanish government “granted Spanish conquerors and colonists parcels of lands and
the right to the labor of the Indians living on them” and this encomienda system led to the
enslavement, murder, and “brutal settlement” of Indigenous people and territories. 7‘8 Yet, there
was criticism of this system—specifically from Bartolome de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria,
a Dominican cleric and a theologian respectively. De las Casas spent time as a Roman Catholic
missionary in Indigenous settlements under the encomienda system and provided accounts of the
brutality and massacre of Indigenous people, while also arguing for “the concept of ‘humanity’
of Indigenous peoples.”9 De Vitoria similarly supported the concept of ‘humanity’ of Indigenous
peoples, but was more concerned “with establishing the governing normative and legal
parameters.”10 He argued that European powers needed to respect the “certain original
autonomous powers and entitlements to land” 11 held by Indigenous people and to recognize their
“natural rights as free peoples”12—thus “rejecting title by discovery or papal grant.” 13 Yet, de
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Vitoria also made clear that, through Christian authority, the Spanish could be justified in waging
war against the Indigenous peoples. Because they persistently interfered with Spanish efforts to
travel, trade, and “proselytize in favor of Christianity,”14 they were not abiding by the “law of
civilized”15 society and thus it would be “just” to declare war against them. 16 This theory of
‘just’ war allowed the Spanish a morally and legally justifiable route to continue ignoring the
rights that may have been afforded to Indigenous peoples and to obtain their lands and labor, and
provided a foundation for the ensuing centuries of conquest and oppression.
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the evolution of the concept and role of the modern state shifted
the international legal framework into what became known as the Law of Nations. The work of
Hobbes illustrates this conceptual shift as philosophers began to go beyond the original ideas of
natural law that de Vitoria discussed, to a dichotomous regime comprised of two categories: “the
natural rights of individuals and the natural rights of the state.” 17 Emmerich de Vattel expanded
on this individual/state dichotomy with his concept of the Law of Nations, which has formed the
“foundation for the doctrine of state sovereignty” and the assertion of state primacy in
international relations.18 Importantly, Vattel also constructed the idea of the nation-state which
failed to encompass the wide variety of social constructions found in human culture and made it
difficult for Indigenous peoples to qualify for the rights and duties afforded to nation-states.19
The qualifications for a nation-state revolved around European conceptions of political and
social organization which meant they were based on “exclusivity of territorial domain and
hierarchical, centralized authority”.”20 These features conflicted with the nature of many precontact Indigenous communities, which were often “organized primarily by tribal or kinship
ties,” with “decentralized political structure[s]” which often “shared overlapping spheres of
territorial control” and were linked in confederations.”21 The cultivation of land—which relates
to settled territories—was based upon the judgement of European authorities, meaning that
Indigenous groups with sedentary communities and agricultural pursuits were assumed to have
more right over their land than societies based on hunting and gathering. 22 Vattel used this
framing to distinguish between the Indigenous societies of South and Central America with
developed cultivation—the Incas and Aztecs—against whom it would not be lawful to wage war
and occupation, and the nomadic Indigenous peoples of North American against whom one
could lawfully wage war in order to settle their territories.23 This distinction provides an example
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of the remaining “ambiguity” with respect to the powers of European states over Indigenous
peoples” under the Law of Nations.24
Under this ambiguity and driven by the “practical reality,” European nations and Indigenous
peoples often negotiated and operated under treaties—which set the outlines of trade, war, and
land rights.25 For example, Spain negotiated treaties with Indigenous groups in Chile that
recognized “Indigenous governing authority,” although it was limited. 26 Treaties were also
negotiated between Indigenous nations and nation-states like England, France, Spain, the Dutch
Republic, and others.27 Despite the dominant role of European powers in negotiating these
agreements, many of these treaties did include and recognize Indigenous legal traditions, like
concepts of “kinship, reciprocity, and sacred trust”—the Gus-Wen-Tah, or the Two Row
Wampum is treaty between Haudenosaunee Confederacy and the Dutch that was made in 1613 28
and illustrates this integration of Indigenous and European legal norms. 29
In summary, this early history was based on the first era of colonization, the development of
traditional conceptions of strict state sovereignty, and the Law of Nations. The dynamic between
Indigenous peoples and European colonizers was complex and multi-dimensional—there was
violent oppression and brutality from colonizers, but there were also early treaties and calls to
respect Indigenous rights in various forms.

Settler Colonialism and American Federal Indian Policy
In the following stages of colonization, European powers began to assert more dominance
and increase their presence in Indigenous territories. This shift built upon the Law of Nations and
westernized notions of morality to further oppress Indigenous peoples and used developing
nation-state law to solidify the pattern of superiority and authority of European colonizers over
Indigenous communities. This section focuses on this evolution within the history of US federal
case law and legislation.
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In the 19th century, the growth of settler colonialism a and settler states led to increased
interference by European nation-states into Indigenous affairs and growing efforts to manage
Indigenous relations through state law.30 This process of “domesticating”31 Indigenous peoples’
law was prevalent in Canada, New Zealand and Australiab, and is exemplified in the United
States through the development and implementation of the US Constitution. The US Constitution
included no input from tribal voices in the drafting or ratification processes 32, yet, Articles I and
VI give Congress the authority to regulate trade with Indian tribes and declare treaties to be the
“supreme Law of the Land.”33 In the late 19th century, the US established the Indian Office as an
intensive bureaucratic approach to consolidating, managing, and “civilizing” the native peoples
in their borders. In 1868, the Indian Commissioner wrote that it was their “most solemn duty to
protect and care for, to elevate and civilize”—this task manifested as extensive and oppressive
control of all Indian affairs through government programs and partnership with Christian
missionary institutions designed to assimilate c.34
These social and legal trends continued. Following the ratification of the US Constitution
and as federal power strengthened, the US Supreme Court began to further intervene in
Indigenous affairs. What became known as the ‘Marshall Trilogy’ reflected this transition—
Worcester v. Georgia (1832), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), and Johnson v. M’Intosh
(1823)—overall concluding that Indian nations were “dependent domestic sovereigns,” but
groups that “retained rights of occupancy and self-governance over their reserved territories” “by
virtue of inherent tribal sovereignty, treaties, and federal supremacy.” 35 In the first Marshall case,
Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), Marshall equivocally accepted the ‘pretension’ of discovery—
a

In “traditional colonialism,” colonizers “relied on a large Indigenous population for labor for the benefit of a small
group of colonists.” Compared to settler colonialism where “the native society had to be marginalized or eliminated”
(Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights,
184). According to Sarah Krakoff, in settler colonialism, “invasion [was] a structure not an event.” (Inextricably
Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 1041, 1119 (2012).)
b
The US was not the only state to increase government involvement in Indigenous affairs, the 1840 Treaty of
Waitangi in New Zealand granted “Maori rights of autonomy over their own affairs,” yet it also recognized British
protection and sovereignty over them. In Australia, the concept of terra nullius was applied to aboriginal lands for
generations, giving the state unlimited ability to annex them. Canada’s Indian Act of 1876 “sought to control and
centralize all aspects of Indian life from identity and governance to land and subsistence.” (Kristen A. Carpenter &
Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 185).
c
These Christian missionary programs were responsible for the concept, “kill the Indian in order to save the man”
which centered around the elimination of Indigenous culture and spirituality. One of the most traumatic and deeply
impactful mechanisms implemented by many Christian missionaries were boarding schools that took young children
from their families to sever ties from their families and Indigenous ways of life. (Hillary Hoffman and Monte Mills,
A Third Way: Decolonizing the Laws of Indigenous Cultural Protection, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020),
17).
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arguing that it was not the basis of discovery that favored the European discoverer over Indian
rights but rather that deference to “U.S. assertions of title by discovery” was necessary in order
to uphold the federal government’s domestic jurisdictional competency. 36 In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia (1831), Marshall declared tribes to be “domestic dependent nations” which means “their
relationship to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”37 In this decision,
Marshall stated the tribes did not qualify as “foreign states” but that this did not entirely place
them outside of the scope of the law of nations because they still possessed “the prerogative
under the law of nations to consent to the protection of another sovereign.” 38 In Worcester v.
Georgia (1832), Marshall confirmed that Native American tribes were subject to the law of
nations (now called international law), upheld their “original natural rights” over their lands, and
stated that “voluntary cession and actual conquest” were the only routes by which Indian tribes
could be divested of their rights, a view consistent with international law at the time. 39 Marshall
qualified this by saying that the doctrine of discovery applied to European discoverers as
customary law but was subordinate to the law of nature which afforded original natural rights of
Indigenous peoples to their land. 40 The Marshall trilogy framework had somewhat paradoxical
effects. It stated that the tribes had rights to occupancy and possession of their lands but that the
federal government had the “ultimate title.” 41 both that tribal authority was not exclusively
derived from treaty relationships—the tribes held inherent sovereignty due to their tribal
governance structures and customs (this is still recognized today)—but also that treaties are the
sole route to conduct tribal-US affairs which was worked to exclude state power or authority
from the equation.42 Even more, these cases established that tribes had sovereign authority within
their territorial boundaries, even if they did not have control over where these territories
were/what the boundaries were. 43
This ability to control and alter territorial boundaries was what enabled the development of
the deeply harmful ‘removal era’ where a number of US Removal Acts and legislation d
encouraging and legalizing settlement on Indigenous territories continually changed and reduced
tribal land bases.44 This mechanism was also used as states often acted beyond treaty terms and
legally-recognized rights—forcing tribes to relocate and/or accept new and oppressive treaty

d

This legislation included the Preemption Act of 1841 and the General Mining Law in 1872. (Hillary Hoffman and
Monte Mills, A Third Way: Decolonizing the Laws of Indigenous Cultural Protection, (UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2020), 31).
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terms.45 In 1871, the US stopped all new treaty making with Indigenous tribes and in 1903, the
Supreme Courte declared that the US “could break treaties with tribes without federal court
review of such actions pursuant to its ‘plenary authority’ over tribal affairs.” 46 Some legal
theorists argued that these treaties were “moral obligations” rather than legal because Indigenous
peoples did not comprehend the full meaning of territorial sovereignty as western colonizers saw
it.47
In addition, there remained a tendency to use European values and standards of behavior as a
metric for rights. While groups like the Cherokee were able to meet some of these standards due
to the influence of western teachings and Christian missionaries in regard to settlement and land
use, many, if not most Indigenous peoples did not fall into these narrow European categories for
social and political organization and thus were not considered worthy of protection and status
under international law.48 Domestic laws emulated these international legal frameworks on
national and subnational levels and thus European metrics for valuation and legal thinking were
embedded in US federal Indian policy.
Overall, this era was characterized by the settlement of colonizers and the creation of systems
of governance that codified the oppression of Indigenous peoples within domestic settings by
neglecting their rights and strengthening US state and federal power and intervention.

The Shift in International Law to Exclude Indigenous Peoples
As the domestic legal setting further repressed Indigenous rights, similar developments in
international law became increasingly solidified. Positivist international legal thinkers drove the
official exclusion of Indigenous peoples from recognition under international law, evidenced by
a few key tribunals and notable cases covered in this section. This pattern began to show slight
shifts in the early 20th century as minority rights were given a small platform in the international
legal arena.
Under the influence of positivist thinking from Vattel and Marshall’s court decisions,
international law shifted to reject any “consideration of Indigenous peoples as political bodies
e

Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 US 553, 565 (1903).
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with rights under international law,” which was a slight difference from earlier attitudes.49 This
happened under four main premises, the first three premises are that “international law is
concerned only with the rights and duties of states,” that it upholds the “exclusive sovereignty of
states,” and that “international law is between and not above states” through their consent. 50 The
fourth premise is that Indigenous peoples do not fall under the “limited universe” of states that
make and are polities to international law. 51 The primary deciding factor in why Indigenous
peoples were excluded from being in this “family of nations,” was because other states did not
consent to it—in other words, the only way to become a nation under international law was to be
recognized as a state by others nation-states who are already in the ‘family.’ 52 This concept
moved beyond the earlier theories about justification of conquest through war, and simplified the
legal legitimation of colonization by providing a legal mechanism—approval through the ‘family
of nations’—by which to justify conquest and claims to sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and
territories.53 Thus, these positivist approaches to international law systematically advantaged
nation-states and this framing formed the foundation for the use of state sovereignty as a
conceptual backing in the oppression of Indigenous peoples 54—an argument that remains
relevant today.
There were a number of important international tribunal decisions in this time period that
demonstrated the dominance of positivist thinking and the exclusion of Indigenous rights in
international law. The first was a 1926 international arbitration tribunal ruling that stated that
Great Britain’s claim for the “Cayuga Nation” was not legal, yet they could make claim to the
Cayuga Indians living in Canada because they were British nationals. 55 The decision asserted
that Indian tribes were “not a legal unit of international law.” 56 In 1928, an international
arbitration between the United States and the Netherlands ruled in favor of the Netherlands claim
to the Island of Palmas because of its “effective occupation and display of authority on the
island,” compared to the US’s inherited claim to prior discovery through Spain. 57 Through this
decision, the tribunal ruled that the treaties the Dutch had made with the Indigenous peoples of
the island were merely ‘facts’ relevant to the case, but that these types of contracts (ie. treaties
with groups not recognized in the family of states under positivist international law) were not
“capable of creating rights and obligations” “in an international law sense.” 58 The third case—
which occurred in 1933 and is of particular relevance to this paper—was regarding the legal
status of Eastern Greenland. The Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that while it
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recognized the Inuit population in Eastern Greenland, the territory’s legal status was nonetheless
defined by sovereignty claims from the Denmark and Norway.59 This decision effectively
ignored Inuit claims to territorial sovereignty or Inuit efforts to block and disrupt Norwegian and
Dutch occupation and colonization, an exemplary illustration of the positivist hierarchy that
placed nation-state sovereignty over Indigenous sovereignty.60
Overall, up through the nineteenth century and beyond, Indigenous peoples “were subjected
to laws that distributed their lands, demolished their economies, usurped their traditional
governance systems, criminalized their religions, and tried to assimilate them into mainstream
society.”61 They were not granted citizenship on national levels nor consistent status under
international law, yet they continued to advocate for their rights and attempted to use
international law and international channels as a means to assert their rights. 62 One of the first
real forums for this assertion was the League of Nations—formed after World War I, it
“promised self-determination for states and protection for minorities” and thus provided a
platform for Indigenous groups to challenge state-inflicted oppression.63 The Six Nations (also
known as the Iroquois Confederacy) submitted a petition to the League of Nations in 1923—they
claimed that Canadian activities, primarily the increased presence of Royal Mounted Police on
reserves, threatened to “destroy all de jure government of the Six Nations” 64 by disrupting the
“traditional leadership and governance practices.” 65 In 1925, the Maori also submitted
complaints to the League based on the Treaty of Waitangi.66 Both Indigenous groups were
prevented from addressing the League due to opposition from their respective nation-states, yet
their petitions and subsequent action generated attention which led to a sort of informal venue to
assert Indigenous rights which then “set in motion a series of developments that slowly advanced
the recognition of Indigenous peoples rights in international law.” 67
Throughout the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, international law shifted from
pure exclusion of Indigenous rights to shallow recognition of the potential for growth in
Indigenous legal and political power.
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The Birth and Evolution of International Human Rights Law
In the mid-1900s, the international and domestic legal attitude towards Indigenous rights
began to change. This shift was associated with the growth in international human rights laws
and the advent of international institutions dedicated to the protection and maintenance of
standards of life for all people and particularly for minorities. In addition, domestic policies
across the world began to reflect this perspective and earlier frameworks of Indigenous
laws/affairs were reformed. This era was a transitionary moment for Indigenous rights in
international law and has greatly contributed to the foundation that now exists.
Following World War II, the formation of human rights institutions and mechanisms—like
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, and the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man68—had a significant influence on the discussion of
Indigenous rights. Even though it was not clear at the time they were developed whether these
instruments could promote the interests of Indigenous peoples, subsequent UN actions worked to
raise awareness of Indigenous peoples and the issues they faced. In 1949, the UN General
Assembly recommended studying the condition of “aboriginal populations and other
underdeveloped social groups of the American continent,”69 in order “to improve their condition
and foster more efficient use of their resources.” 70 And, in 1957, the International Labor
Organization issued Convention 107 on the protection of Indigenous peoples from exploitation
as they were integrated into larger national societies in the industrial era. 71 While ILO 107 has
since been criticized for largely being an instrument of assimilation, the convention still
represented the “first treaty to single out Indigenous peoples as special subjects of human rights
concern”72 and one of the first acknowledgements of Indigenous rights in contemporary
international human rights law. f

f

According to Anaya, ILO 107 was a significant recognition of the need to improve the social and economic
conditions for Indigenous populations, yet the general “scheme” of the convention did not hold a long-term vision
for “robust, politically significant cultural and associational patterns of Indigenous groups.” For example, ILO 107
focused on rights for members of Indigenous populations, compared to Indigenous groups/peoples—thus rather than
supporting cultural self-determination within Indigenous groups, the convention was geared towards individual-level
improvements in living conditions, often within national programs of assimilation and integration. (Anaya, S. James,
“Developments Over Time,” in Indigenous Peoples in International Law, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996),
ProQuest Ebook Central, 44-45.)
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The emphasis on human rights law as a mechanism to enhance Indigenous rights increased
after the global decolonization movement of the 1950s and 1960s failed to generate support for
Indigenous claims of self-determination.g Indigenous leaders saw human rights instruments as a
way to address their numerous concerns, yet Indigenous considerations were largely not
specifically mentioned in international legal discussions of minority rights.73 In 1966, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was adopted, which
stated that all ‘peoples’ have a right to “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”74 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
affirmed the rights of minority groups to “enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
own religion, [and] to use their own language.”75 A number of UNESCO agreements similarly
stated a right to cultural identity. 76 In 1969, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) “required states to adopt measures combating racial
prejudices and discrimination.”77
The recognition of the right to self-determination within the ICESCR and ICCPR coincided
with the growing Indigenous human rights movement beginning around the 1960s. 78 As
international law and Indigenous advocacy increasingly intersected, there were a number of
important developments. First, Indigenous advocates started making appearances at the ILO,
UN, and UNESCO which caused these institutions to “reassess the role of Indigenous peoples in
international law”79 and begin to make structural and political changes. For example, in 1977, the
UN Economic and Social Council granted the International Indian Treaty Council h “nongovernmental organization” status. Then, a “highly influential study on Indigenous peoples” was
released by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities i.80‘81 The study outlined the “oppression, marginalization, and exploitation suffered

g

The global decolonization movement and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples (1960) focused on condemning colonialism, segregation, and discrimination—colonies in Asia, Africa,
and Oceania gained independence but subsequent Indigenous claims for self-determination within these new
governments were largely unrealized (Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 187.)
h
The International Indian Treaty Council was founded in 1974 at a gathering of the American Indian Movement in
Standing Rock, South Dakota ((Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 189.)
i
According to Augusto Willemsen Diaz, who was a significant contributor to the study and in the creation of the UN
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, the intention behind the study was to “bring the issue of Indigenous
rights to the attention of the UN’s human rights bodies and organs with the aim of giving direction to the
instruments that might be adopted and to the actions that could be taken on the issue within the UN itself, offering
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by Indigenous peoples” and catalyzed discussions about how to address these problems. 82 And,
in 1977, the UN hosted in Geneva an NGO conference that focused on discrimination against
Indigenous peoples; two hundred Indigenous representatives were in attendance. 83 The UN SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights established the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP) in 1982, which served as a formal and structured venue
that Indigenous peoples could use to voice their struggles, experiences, and values, and states
could respond.84 Each of these developments provided the foundation for the evolution of
Indigenous rights in international law and the developing regime we see now.
In addition, federal Indian law within the US shifted with the varied structures in Alaska, the
institution of tribal governance structures and constitutions, and the growing decolonization
movement. In Alaska, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act—which was passed by the US
Congress in 1971—divided the state into twelve for-profit regional corporations with an
overarching governance structure and local village corporations within each region. 85 Each
Alaska Native is eligible to be a shareholder either in the village and regional corporations, or
“at-large,” and the village corporations can be non-profit or for-profit (so far all are for-profit). 86
The purpose of the act was to make a lump sum purchase in exchange for Native Alaskans
ceding claims and waiving future legal rights to their lands.87 Alaska is widely considered to be
unique among states in the US because of this relatively extensive recognition of Indigenous
rights and ANSCA is the foundation for this political, legal, and social structure. 88
Across the United States, in the mid-twentieth century, the federal government instituted a
number of policies aimed at governing tribal recognition, tribal governmental structures, natural
resources development, and child welfare.89 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), also
called the Wheeler-Howard Act, was the formal beginning of a new era in US federal Indian
policy that offered investment in economic and tribal development on the conditional terms of
tribal adoption of “quasi-federal governmental structures”—which primarily meant federal
oversight in the development of new ‘westernized and democratic’ constitutions, a sort of
“middle ground between assimilation and total exclusion from a federal system.” 90 This policy

goals that were more congruent with the aspirations and hopes of the indigenous peoples.” (Augusto Willemson
Diaz, How Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Reached the UN, in Making the Declaration Work, 19)
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approach transitioned into termination statutesj, a form of “legislative backsliding” that was
supposed to end “federal supervision” like the IRA and eventually into federal policies in the
1970s and 1980s that finally began to focus on “revitalizing tribal economies” and reversing
problematic trends and policies (like missionary boarding schools) from the past. 91
Overall, these developments within international and domestic law and the strengthening of
the Indigenous rights movement catalyzed the transition from Indigenous peoples being “the
forgotten people of international law,”92 to their increasingly important role in the evolution of
human rights law. Carpenter and Riley describe this phenomenon, stating that, “events
comprising the Indigenous rights movement reveal not only "law's migration," but also its
generative force and potential to loosen colonization's bind.”93 This observation highlights the
process of norm development—outlining how the Indigenous rights movement and changing
norms catalyzed legal evolution and initiated norm development within international law.
This entire overview illustrates how Indigenous rights have historically grown and evolved
through this complex process of norm development and demonstrates the semi-chronological
narrative of this process. The analysis in this paper also supports the argument that three main
processes have contributed to this process and the advancement of Indigenous rights: the
favorable interpretation of existing international law—particularly human rights law, the
development of new international legal instruments that are specifically focused on Indigenous
rights and issues, and successful litigation in international courts.94 This framework will be
helpful for this paper.
* * *
By the end of the 1980s, the efforts of people within the Indigenous rights movement
began to generate substantive political action and further progress this process of norm
development, primarily through global human rights institutions. These institutions—in
particular, the UN and ILO—issued documents that have largely set the stage for international
recognition of Indigenous rights. This section will provide more background on the theoretical
j

Many of these termination statues had long-lasting detrimental impacts on Native tribes and communities. One
such statute was Public Law 280 which introduced state jurisdiction and authority into Indian affairs in certain states
and has had complicated implications for current jurisdictional frameworks across the US. (Hillary Hoffman and
Monte Mills, A Third Way: Decolonizing the Laws of Indigenous Cultural Protection, (UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2020), 35.)
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foundation of Indigenous rights—in content and interpretation—before discussing these
international declarations as well analyzing how international Indigenous rights have been
implemented and enforced in practice, particularly in international courts. These theoretical
foundations of Indigenous self-determination and rights have been critical to the development of
legal norms on the international stage.

Anaya’s Framework of Self-Determination
There are a number of foundational principles of Indigenous rights that are important to
the context of this paper, in particular, this paper uses James Anaya’s framework of selfdetermination as a foundation for understanding Indigenous rights in international law. He
argues that Indigenous peoples have consistently framed their demands—what rights they
deserve—in terms of self-determination and that the international movement for Indigenous
rights has thus often adopted this framing. Anaya states that self-determination, in brief, is based
on the idea that “all are equally entitled to control their own destinies.” 95 He argues that “selfdetermination comprises a standard of governmental legitimacy within the modern human rights
frame,” although he rejects arguments for full sovereignty as understood in a traditional state
sovereignty context because he believes that requires yielding to this western colonialist
conception of sovereignty and statehood which inherently limits Indigenous rights. 96’97 He is
also hesitant to utilize the dominant human rights framework as it is so based on individual
rights, and, as has been noted, communal rights and collective experiences are a key piece of
Indigenous rights—rather he argues that self-determination and his framework for Indigenous
rights are complemented by the human rights narrative.9899
In defining self-determination, Anaya states that there are two “normative strains” of selfdetermination—interpreted as constitutive and ongoing aspects. k100 The constitutive aspect
requires that during processes of institutional growth, change, or birth, that the “governing

k

In the past, self-determination was often framed within a dichotomy—of external and internal—which was based
on a narrow interpretation of community and human association. Anaya’s two strains are mutually contributing and
operate along a spectrum of human community and association. (S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights in International
Law, 81.)
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institutional order” be created in a way that is “guided by the will of the people,” l and the
ongoing aspect requires that the governing institutional order “be one under which people may
live and develop freely on a continuous basis.” 101 In other words, the constitutive aspect means
that people must be able to “freely determine their political status” and the ongoing aspect of
self-determination means that people must continually be able to make meaningful choices in
various matters and all spheres of their life, they must be able to “freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development”. m’102
Anaya outlines five dimensions of self-determination within international norms:
nondiscrimination, cultural integrity, lands and resources, social welfare and development, and
self-government.103 Nondiscrimination is the “absence of policies or practices that invidiously
discriminate against individuals or groups”—for Indigenous peoples, this often means that it is
internationally unacceptable for states to have institutions or “tolerate practices that perpetuate an
inferior status” for Indigenous peoples, and that rather, states might be expected to take
“affirmative steps to eliminate the incidents and legacies of discrimination.” 104 The cultural
integrity norm upholds the right of Indigenous peoples to “maintain and freely develop their
cultural identities”—this often includes language and religion among other cultural traditions and
practices. 105 The importance of lands and resources to Indigenous peoples is widely
acknowledged within international law—both as a right to subsistence use, a proprietary right,
and as a right to participate in the “use, management and conservation” of, as well to benefit
from, their resources. n106 Social welfare rights are rights to “higher standards of living, full
employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development,” often including
specific rights to economic development projects.107’108 Within international legal norms, states
are generally expected to create special projects to promote improvement in this area for
Indigenous peoples to respond to a history of exploitation and oppression.109 The right to selfgovernment is the overarching basis of the ongoing aspect of self-determination.110
l

In the constitutive aspect, self-determination does not necessarily dictate the creation and formation of political
order, but rather suggests standards of participation and consent. (S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights in
International Law, 82.)
m
This wording has been adopted by numerous human rights covenants and international instruments, including in
Article 3 of UNDRIP. (S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights in International Law, 82; UN General Assembly, United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October
2007, A/RES/61/295, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html.)
n
This paper will include a more extensive discussion of Indigenous rights in lands and resources later on,
specifically in relation to subsurface mineral rights and rights tied to the exploration and development of their
territories.
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Interpretations of this right differ, but there are two general themes: the first is a “right to
autonomy” (which is more controversial in practice as it involves rejecting the sovereignty and
authority of nation-states and assuming full territorial autonomy), and the second, which is more
widely recognized, is a right to “maintain and develop their traditional institutions and to
otherwise enjoy autonomous spheres of governmental or administrative authority appropriate to
their circumstances.”111
These categories provide a brief outline of the right to self-determination as it is
perceived by Indigenous advocates and as it evolves within international customary law. They do
not specifically dictate a legal definition and meaning of self-determination because this has been
left “open-ended” within international law. 112 Despite this ambiguity in interpretation, selfdetermination has been recognized as the preeminent concept in Indigenous rights and is often
considered to be an essential norm in international law for both Indigenous rights and the wider
world of human rights. This next section of the paper will provide examples of how selfdetermination and its associated rights have been interpreted and implemented in the world of
international law with respect to Indigenous peoples.

Self-Determination in International Law: The ILO
The sentiments behind Indigenous self-determination and the frameworks of rights
pushed by Indigenous advocates generated international legal and political change. In 1989,
following in the footsteps of the 1957 Convention 107, the International Labor Organization
issued Convention 169 “Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples.” 113 The new convention
stated that “Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and
fundamental freedoms without hindrance of discrimination.” 114 ILO 169 asserted respect for
Indigenous ways of life and went further than ILO 107 by directly recognizing the rights of
Indigenous peoples.115’116 Even more than recognizing the need to respect the “customs and
customary law,” as well as “social, cultural, religious, and spiritual values and practices” of
Indigenous peoples, the convention expressed the need for “special measures” to protect
Indigenous peoples and their ways of life. 117 The convention stated that governments
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“shall…consult the peoples concerned…whenever consideration is being given to legislative or
administrative measures which may affect them directly.” 118 Among these provisions, ILO 169
expressed support for advancing Indigenous cultural integrity, land and resource rights, and
nondiscrimination in social welfare spheres.119
Many of these principles were relatively progressive for the time, yet there was still
criticism of the failure of the process to include meaningful Indigenous participation and of the
limited nature of the rights that were recognized, as well as the process by which they could be
implemented. For example, ILO 169 deliberately excluded recognition of rights to selfdetermination120—a concept that, as noted above, was and is integral to Indigenous rights and
meaningful legal recognition of Indigenous peoples’ issues. Throughout and following the
drafting process, the decision to exclude direct mentions of self-determination also generated
controversy over terminology in the convention in regard to whether or not to use the term
‘peoples’ versus ‘populations’—because the term ‘peoples’ was widely associated with selfdeterminationo.121 Indigenous advocates claimed that ‘peoples’ is generally recognized to hold a
“greater and more positive recognition of group identity and corresponding attributes of
community” than ‘populations’ or ‘members of Indigenous groups’.122 The convention resolved
the debate by allowing the use of ‘peoples’ but making a note that this wording should not be
associated with self-determination as it is understood in international law.123 Overall, the
convention had few absolute rules, yet it furthered the premise behind self-determination—ie.
valuing and supporting Indigenous ways of life—through recognition of Indigenous issues and
support for at least minimal Indigenous rights.124
The ILO convention is binding on states who ratify it and these states cannot make
reservations—thus creating treaty obligations that can be used to advance Indigenous rights and

o

In the UN Charter, there is a phrase “self-determination and equal rights of peoples” which formed the basis of the
argument against using the term ‘peoples’ in ILO 169 because people thought it would connote recognition of selfdetermination and the ILO strongly wanted to avoid the implication of supporting “succession.” There were similar
concerns with the use of the word “territories.” (Anaya, S. James, “Developments Over Time,” in Indigenous
Peoples in International Law, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996), ProQuest Ebook Central, 48-49.)
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Indigenous demands.p’125 Although only 22 states have ratified the convention globally q and thus
only 22 nations are bound to the convention’s provisions126, the fact that an international body
and document has declared Indigenous rights as legitimate contributes to norm-setting in
international customary law and has furthered the development of Indigenous rights within
customary international law. This diffusion has occurred both through the formation of an
international forum to discuss Indigenous issues and binding obligations on an international
stage, but also through the creation of domestic policies in support of the convention. Even states
that have not ratified the convention—over the prior mentioned concerns—have passed a variety
of domestic initiatives aimed at supporting the core precept of the convention and specific
provisions within it.127 However, there is disagreement over the domestic implementation of ILO
provisions and precepts, particularly in Ecuador and Paraguay, which reemphasizes the often
problematic rift between supposed international commitments and actual state practice. 128
ILO 169 has been a step along the pathway towards making Indigenous rights and
recognition of Indigenous voices a norm in legal, political, economic, and cultural spaces. The
convention is supportive, yet not decisive for the growth of Indigenous rights. Due both to the
fact that the convention lacks in strong content and enforcement abilities and that Indigenous
rights are a complex issue requiring a multi-faceted approach, ILO 169 is merely a part of the
larger puzzle. Although it is distinctly different, UNDRIP plays a similar role in the bigger
picture of Indigenous rights and this next section will elaborate upon that discussion.

Self-Determination in International Law: UNDRIP
The next international document with great relevance to this paper and to Indigenous
rights is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). First, it is

p

There were 39 governments represented in the ILO conference committee (in addition to other workers and
employers who are involved in the ILO structure) and none of the government delegates voted against the
convention 169, although some abstained over concerns that the Convention went too far with specific provisions
and implications (like the terms “territories” and “peoples”). (Anaya, S. James, “Developments Over Time,” in
Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 52-53.)
q
Of these 22 states, the only Arctic nations are Denmark and Norway. The US has not ratified ILO 169. ILO 169 is
generally considered to be most significant in South America where 15 of the 22 states are located. (Joshua Cooper,
25 Years of ILO Convention 169, Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine, March 2015; Kristen A. Carpenter &
Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 191.)
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important to look back at the UN Charter of 1945 and recognize the relevant articles that
provided a foundation for the inclusion of Indigenous issues in international the human rights
regime. Of particular note, articles 1(3), 13(1,b), 55 and 56, among others, outlined the principles
of “self-determination and equal rights of peoples”129—the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights reiterated these principles. 130 In 1982, the UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations was created which included a sub-group focused on generating a draft
declaration.r’131 Over the course of the next sixteen years, this draft declaration went through
various stages and working groups in the UN Commission on Human Rights until, in 2007, the
UN General Assembly adopted the final declaration. s‘t132 Since 2007, all other nations except the
US have approved UNDRIP, although the Obama Administration stated that the US would
“lend its support” to the declaration, with qualifications that clarified the supremacy of existing
laws and federal policies over a right to self-determination.133
UNDRIP, which is comprised of 46 articles in total, is widely considered to be a historic
document—largely because it fulfills Indigenous requests to be recognized as peoples with rights
of self-determination.134 This right is enumerated in Article 3 and was included primarily due to
Indigenous advocacy which emphasized the role of ‘self-determination’ as the core foundational
concept of Indigenous rights. u
The first article frames the document—“Indigenous peoples have the right to the full
enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as
recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(4)
and international human rights law.”135 The document declares that Indigenous peoples have the
right to be free from discrimination, as well as to be guaranteed the rights to enjoy and practice
their cultures, customs, religions, languages, and to develop and strengthen their economics and

r

This UNWGIP draft declaration was released in 1993. (Augusto Willemson Diaz, How Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Reached the UN, in Making the Declaration Work, 28.)
s
There were four votes against UNDRIP in 2007, including the US and Canada (in addition to New Zealand and
Australia), which voted against the declaration largely based on concerns about the right to self-determination
articulated in Article 3 and requirements for consent of Indigenous peoples in certain decisions (Article 19).
(Asbjorn Eide, The Indigenous Peoples, The Working Group on Indigenous Populations and The Adoption of The
UN Declaration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Making the Declaration Work, 40-42).
t
It is important to note that a key component of the distinction between these four non-approving states and other
states (particularly in Latin America and Africa) was that decolonization language had different connotations—due
to
u
This chapter includes a more intensive discussion of self-determination and it’s foundational significance to
Indigenous rights in following pages.
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social and political institutions and possess nationality.136 The document addresses rights to land
and resources and rights of consultation and consent in development projects.137Overall,
UNDRIP works to express the rights that “constitute the minimum standards for the survival,
dignity and well-being of the Indigenous peoples of the world” (Article 43). 138
Despite how monumental and foundational UNDRIP has been in the development of
international Indigenous rights, there are a number of limitations both in the text and in the
implementation mechanisms for the document. First, the meaning of self-determination was
qualified in order to appease concerns of certain states over infringement of their sovereignty.139
Article 46 (1) states that nothing in the document should be “construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally or in part the territorial
integrity or political unity of any state.”140’141 This clause both weakens to full meaning behind
self-determination and reinforces a traditional state-sovereignty framework in international law.
Second, the document is non-binding and thus unenforceable in a formal legal sense.
Implementation requires states to ratify the declaration within their national governance
institutions and pass legislation implementing the provisions of the declaration. 142 This lack of
international enforcement changes the nature of the declaration significantly as it allows states to
interpret the rules as they see fit. In the US, the State Department has said that, although the
document is non-binding, it maintains “moral and political force,” which can be understood to
mean that is has soft-law implications that should guide behavior, but it does not have the ability
to drastically change state practices. v’143
The UN has a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues which is an advisory body
comprised of an equal number of government appointees and Indigenous representatives and
appointed experts.144 While the forum does provide a high-level setting to discuss and address
Indigenous issues, it has been criticized for how it still maintains hierarchies of statedominance.145 One example of this is the fact that there are differential limits on plenary
speaking time and seating arrangements for state and Indigenous representatives.146 Again, this
body shows how Indigenous representation in international law is often a paradox of pros and
cons.

v

In fact, Carpenter and Riley argue that the State Department’s focus as of 2014 was on identifying the US
programs that already comply with these UNDRIP standards, “rather than outlining areas for reform.”( Kristen A.
Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 215.)
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More so, the complexities of UNDRIP demonstrate both the shortcomings of hard law as
a solution to Indigenous rights and the value that hard law can provide in an international
political setting. UNDRIP is a hugely formative piece of international Indigenous rights and has
been pivotal in the diffusion, evolution, and solidification of these norms, yet, again, it remains
only a component part of the larger arena. The next section will discuss specific legal cases that
are constituents of this puzzle.

Self-Determination in International Law: Case Law
There have been a number of court decisions on the international level relating to
Indigenous rights, particularly within the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that have been
critical in setting the foundation for Indigenous legal rights. They provide context to understand
how self-determination and Indigenous rights have been interpreted in practice. The InterAmerican Court—which primarily bases decisions on the American Convention on Human
Rightsw—has decided and issued a number rulings in response to petitions on the merits,
precautionary measures, and other reports and statements on Indigenous rights leading up the
start of the decade. 147’148 This paper focuses on cases relevant to land and resource rights within
the scope of self-determination which still often includes recognition of cultural integrity,
development, and self-government, but for the purposes of this paper it is necessary to narrow
the discussion.
In 2001, the Court decided its first case on Indigenous land rights—Mayagna (Sumo)
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua.149’150 The state of Nicaragua had granted a logging company the
rights to take timber from the territory of the Awas Tingni. 151 The Court drew from Article 21 x

w

The American Convention on Human Rights (also known as the “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”) is a multilateral
treaty within the Organization of American States that was intended to regulate the implementation and enforcement
of human rights. The convention went into force in 1978. (Organization of American States (OAS), American
Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36510.html [accessed May 2021]).
x
“Article 21: Right to Property. 1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to
the forms established by law. 3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by
law.” (Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa
Rica, 22 November 1969, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36510.html [accessed May 2021]).
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in the American Convention in order to protect the communal property rights of the Awas Tingni
against the claims of the logging company. 152 First, the Court acknowledged the communal
nature of Indigenous relationships to land and human associations, stating that the “ownership of
land is not centered on the individual but rather on the group and community.” 153 The Court said
that “possession of the land should suffice for Indigenous communities lacking real title to
property of the land to obtain official recognition” of ownership, and that nothing, including the
actions of private parties, would “affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the
property.”154 This right to communal property was not absolute though.
This first case marked an important moment in the history of Indigenous rights,
regardless of the fact that it could have gone farther. First, it set the norm that Indigenous rights
can be heard and ruled upon in a legal court. Second, as noted, the Court recognized Indigenous
communal land rights in a meaningful way and recognized that Indigenous voices can be viewed
and valued above private industry interests.
The American Convention’s right to property often “yields to public interests,” and in the
2005 Yakye-Axa v. Paraguay155 case, the Court initiated a new approach to evaluation of land
and resource rights in traditional territories. The Yakye Axa community, which had been
displaced from their traditional territory, filed a complaint claiming that the state of Paraguay
had failed to acknowledge their communal property rights over their traditional lands, in addition
to a number of other claims about the dismal living conditions of the community. 156 The Court
recognized these claims and started applying an evolving test to assess state interferences on
traditional lands—the test considers “the restriction’s legality, necessity, and proportionality with
a ‘legitimate objective in a democratic society.’” 157 These varied interpretations suggested that a
communal right to property under Article 21 was still uncertain, highlighting the variation in the
practical application of rights of self-determination.158
Similar to Awas Tingni, the Yakye-Axa case was significant both in further norming the
idea that Indigenous rights can be heard and recognized in an international legal setting, and in
the fact that it contributed to the conversation over communal land rights, even if it didn’t
actually clarify any direct questions.
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In contrast, also in 2005, in Moiwana Village v. Suriname, the Court unconditionally
embraced communal rights to property. y’159 The state and militia forces had invaded Moiwana
Village and killed many village members over suspicions of involvement in the insurgency
movement.160 The Court found numerous violations of human rights and legal principles, one of
which was a wholesale confirmation that Article 21 recognizes communal rights to property. 161
This ruling did clarify the question of communal property rights and deepened the legal support
for human and Indigenous rights in an international setting.
The Yakye-Axa Community v. Paraguay in 2005 was the first in the Paraguayan trilogy of
cases before the Inter-American Court. Beyond the communal property rights found in Article
21, the case was decided largely on the basis of Article 4 z of the American Convention, which
establishes a right to a vida digna (ie. a decent life).162 The Court also recognized a right to
cultural identity and integrity. 163 In 2006, Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguayaa, affirmed Moiwana’s
assertion of a communal right to property and clarified that Indigenous peoples do not need to
currently possess lands in order for them be considered ancestral lands/to qualify for land rights,
if there is ancestral possession.164165 According to the Tribunal, ancestral possession represents a
unique relationship with the land that can be, “spiritual or ceremonial ties; settlements or
sporadic cultivation; seasonal or nomadic gathering, hunting and fishing; the use of natural
resources associated with their customs and any other element characterizing their culture.” 166
Xakmok Kasek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay bb, in 2010, largely reiterated and clarified
these rights to communal property, vida digna, and cultural identity. 167’168 The three Paraguayan

y

In Moiwana Village v. Suriname, the Court also made interpretations of how to classify/define “Indigenous” in the
international legal world—they identified the Moiwana Village as Indigenous even though they settled in the 19 th
century, based on their relationship to the land with similar cultural, spiritual, and material elements to the Awas
Tingni. (Tom Antkowiak, Rights, Resources and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Interamerican Court, 145.)
z
“Article 4: Right to Life. Section 1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be
protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
((Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa Rica,
22 November 1969, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36510.html [accessed May 2021]).
aa
In Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, the Sawhoyamaxa community had been displaced from their traditional lands. The
Court ordered the state of Paraguay to adopt all necessary measures to return the community to their territories, to
create a development fund, and pay compensation for damages. (Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 1 120 (Mar. 29, 2006)).
bb
In Xakmok Kasek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the state had unfairly sold and split up the traditional lands
of the Xakmok Kasek Indigenous Community. The Court ordered land to be identified and returned to the
community, as well as the recognition of a number of other rights—largely related to cultural integrity, social
welfare, and development. (Xakmok Kisek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 (Aug. 24, 2010).)
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cases were crucial to the furthered development of these three rights which are critical to the
foundation of Indigenous rights and international norms on self-determination.
Despite the importance of these rulings, the narrative of these cases is not linear—it has
been a path of progress and regression, which is a familiar story in the development of
Indigenous legal rights. These cases still left ambiguity in regard to aspects of Indigenous rights
and the Court continued to clarify these questions in the following set of cases.
In 2007, in the case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, the Court looked more closely
at the issues that were present in the Awas Tingni case and the rights associated with mining and
resource extraction (logging) on Indigenous lands. 169’170 The state had granted logging and
mining rights to private companies on traditional lands without consulting the Saramaka
people.171 In acknowledging the claims of the Saramaka people, the Court looked again at Article
21, and reinterpreted it to contain a right to self-determination.172 With this framework, the Court
looked at how important lands and resources are to the lives, rights, and cultural resilience of
Indigenous communities and instituted three safeguards states must employ when pursuing
resource extraction/development. 173 The first is to ensure effective participation regarding
development, exploration, extraction, or investment plans in their territory.174 The next is that
states must guarantee that the community will receive reasonable benefit from the proposed
project.175 And third, “independent and technically capable entities, with the State’s supervision”
must complete an environmental and social impact assessment.176’177
In the Saramaka decision, the Court focused on the idea of cultural survival, which, while
important, allowed the Court to justify lower benchmarks for state obligations. The standards for
‘pure survival’ were very different from those of self-determination and vida digna, as they
basically allowed the Court to offer a more conservative ruling that would not conflict with
federal policies.178 The UN Human Rights Committee continued with this interpretation with
Lansmen et al. v. Finlandcc which stated that states are allowed to “pursue development activities
that limit the rights of a minority culture so long as they do not fully extinguish the Indigenous
people’s way of life.”179’180 Thus, the Court was interpreting self-determination within a narrow
cc

In Lansmen et al. v. Finland, Indigenous members of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen's Committee claimed that the
quarrying of stone (which the state had granted rights to a private company to pursue) violated their right cultural
integrity because it would infringe upon reindeer herding which is a vital subsistence and cultural resource.
(Lansman v. Finland, Views, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Commc'n No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Oct. 26, 1994).)
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framework, one purely based on survival and thus lacking the nuance behind the meaning selfdetermination and the freedom to practice Indigenous ways of life and conflicting with earlier
commitments to a vida digna and wider cultural integrity.
In 2012, in Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Court’s decision not
only affirmed communal property rights for Indigenous peoples, it also went a step further to say
that the whole group—the Sarayaku—experienced these collective property violations. This
went beyond past decisions which just cited individuals within the group as experiencing these
violations—this also suggested a wider interpretation of the meaning of the word ‘person’ in
Article 1 of the convention. 181 In Sarayaku, the state contracted with private companies and the
militia to invade traditional Sarayaku lands in order to use explosives for seismic exploration for
energy development.182
The Sarayaku decision did not extend as far as Saramaka though, in that it did not
reference a right to self-determination, avoided discussion of benefits in the three stage
evaluation of state interference, and did not note a requirement or expectation for consent,
lowering standards of effective participation. 183 Alternatively, the Court argued that the right to
effective participation is included within ILO 169 and the American Convention, but beyond a
recognized norm in these regimes, the Court tried to establish this right as a “general principle of
international law.”184 Sarayaku also extended this right to effective participation/convention
from their prior focus on resource extraction and commercial development to include “any
administrative or legislative actions that may affect Indigenous and tribal rights.” 185 The Court
also reintroduced the concept of cultural identity from Yakye, stating that this right to
consultation involved discussion of the consequences to lands and cultural identity, linking the
right to life (vida digna) and cultural integrity. 186 This holistic approach is important but also
been criticized for always making property rights the primary principle and standing for
Indigenous rights which is paradoxically narrow and can create a problem where by
relinquishing property rights in favor of economic development, Indigenous groups may
simultaneously lose their entire collection of rights. 187 As the interpretation of the right to
effective participation has evolved, the Court has begun to give more deference to states in this
process, which has effectively limited this right even more. 188
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The Court has also provided differential interpretations of the role of consent dd in
consultation—utilizing the approach of UNDRIP with ambiguity towards when consent is
actually required even though it is always considered the ‘objective’ of consultation. 189 For
example, in UNDRIP and in Saramaka, the required consultations are intended to work towards
reaching agreement (obtaining consent) but it is only required in “large scale” projects that
would have a “profound impact” on the community and territory. 190 UNDRIP identifies these
projects as involving relocation or storage/disposal of toxic waste in traditional territories. 191
Sarayaku didn’t address this right to consent or consent standards, emphasizing the lack of
agreement in the international legal community about what consultation means and when
consultation involves full consent versus when it involves ‘good faith’ and active consultation
with no Indigenous veto-authority.ee’192
These cases provide a framework for understanding Indigenous rights in international
law—iterating some of the crucial provisions of Indigenous rights (ie. self-determination and
constituent parts: FPIC/consultation, communal property rights, cultural integrity, etc.) while
also highlighting the lack of agreement and clarity on the legal status of these rights. Through
mechanisms of diffusion, the decisions made in these cases have also impacted court rulings on
the domestic level and policy development in other institutions, both domestic and
international.ff’ gg
Diffusion of these principles and standards has two primary consequences. First, it serves
to further establish discussion of Indigenous issues and rights as common and expected across
various jurisdictions. Second, this diffusion and multi-faceted approach to rights development
can either serve to clarify or further blur the content of Indigenous rights. The above mentioned
cases demonstrate how the interpretation and meaning of Indigenous rights often shift between
dd

The terminology typically used for consent is free, prior, informed consent (FPIC). (Tom Antkowiak, Rights,
Resources and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Interamerican Court, 166).
ee
The UN Human Rights Committee, the African Commission, and other financial institutions and corporations
have expressed support for including FPIC as a crucial and mandated component of consultation. (Tom Antkowiak,
Rights, Resources and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Interamerican Court, 166.)
ff
For example, in the US, the Navajo Nation created a Human Rights Commission (NNHRC) in 2006 which is
tasked with addressing “discriminatory actions against citizens of the Navajo Nation.” The NNHRC successfully
lobbied within their county court for recognition of Navajo water and subsistence rights. (Kristen A. Carpenter &
Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 176).
gg
In 2007, in Aurelio Cal v. Belize, the Supreme Court of Belize cited the UNDRIP (draft) in recognizing the
Indigenous property rights based on customary land tenure. And Similar decisions have been ruled in South Africa,
Botswana, and Indonesia. (Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative
Moment in Human Rights, 176, 114).
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ambiguity and clarity, conservative approaches and progressive advancement. Yet, these cases
and declarations also demonstrate widespread recognition of a right to self-determination and a
growing acceptance of Indigenous rights within in international law.
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Chapter 2
Indigenous Rights in Extractive Industry in Arctic Nations: Case Studies Into the Political,
Cultural, and Socioeconomic Contexts of the Region
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This chapter will use case studies in the Arctic to explore Indigenous rights in extractive
industry. Each case study will reveal the various ways in which Indigenous peoples exercise selfdetermination and how the structural, political, and socio-cultural dynamics of each Arctic nation
serve to diminish and/or support those efforts. As part of this discussion, each section will
explore the historical foundations for Indigenous rights in extractive industry in each nation in
the context of the nation’s priorities and particular relationship to the Arctic. The nations covered
will be the United States, Canada, Russia, Greenland, and Sápmi which includes Norway,
Sweden, and Finland. The chapter first explores the US, Canada, and Russia because they are
superpowers in the Arctic and globally and thus have the ability to greatly impact international
norm development and diffusion of Indigenous rights.
This case by case analysis will demonstrate the uniqueness of each situation and the
significant difference depending upon the nation, Indigenous community, extractive players, and
local legal setting. These distinctions are important because they illustrate the fact that
Indigenous rights are a complex puzzle involving multiple legal systems and frameworks.
Equally importantly though, this discussion reveals similarities between each case and highlights
recurring themes that are central to the conversation over Indigenous rights and extraction and
relate to patterns covered in chapter one. The first theme is the consistently important place of
Indigenous advocates in pushing for rights, recognition, and enforcement. The next theme is the
continued oppression of Indigenous peoples under the hands of colonialist nation-state
governments who repress Indigenous voices in order to prioritize economic growth and
extractive development. The last theme is the complicated interplay between extractive
development and self-determination and the fact that meaningful Indigenous rights afford choice
and opportunity, not simply an absence of extraction.
These cases can also be viewed upon numerous different axes of comparison—the nature
of domestic regulations and legislative support for Indigenous rights, the importance of resource
extraction in the region to the nation, and the overall status and ability to exercise selfdetermination of land and cultural rights for the Indigenous communities in the state. There are
many other ways to compare and contrast these cases, but I will use these metrics to frame this
case-based review. Here is a table that presents information on these qualifications—the details
will be elaborated upon throughout the chapter. This table depicts my own judgements based on
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my understanding of the cases and is a simplified representation of the data. There are four
options on the scale: minimal, moderate, adequate, and well-established.
Arctic State

The importance of
resource extraction
in the region to the
nation

United States

The nature of
domestic
regulations and
legislative support
for Indigenous
rights
Adequate

Adequate

The overall status and
ability to exercise selfdetermination of land and
cultural rights for the
Indigenous communities in
the state
Adequate

Canada

Adequate to Well-

Adequate

Adequate

Established
Russia

Minimal

Well-Established

Minimal

Greenland

Well-Established*

Well-Established

Well-Established*

Sami Land

Adequate

Adequate to Well-

Adequate to Well-

Established

Established

(Norway,
Finland, Sweden)

*While Greenland has more functional self-determination than most, it is important to qualify
this recognizing that it is still a colony of Denmark which severely impairs its ability to be wellestablished.

The United States: The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
The United States has four main priority frames for engagement in the Arctic:
energy/economic development, security, climate/environmental change, and
politics/governance.1 The Arctic holds important fossil fuel deposits for the nation and the onset
of climate change is opening up other economic opportunities in shipping, tourism, and further
energy development.2 Climate change is also posing threats to US security in the North and
communities in the American Arctic (which are primarily Indigenous) and leading to conflicts
over resources, and jurisdiction and sovereignty. 3 I judge the Unites states as adequate in all
three categories based on the information provided in this section. All of these frames will be
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discussed further in this chapter, both in the US and other Arctic nations, but first, it is important
to provide a more in-depth look at the status of Indigenous rights in Alaska.
The case of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) represents the struggle over
Indigenous rights in extractive industry in the Arctic. The debate surrounding ANWR and its
development reflect numerous themes that are relevant to this discussion, including the cultural
significance of land and resource access for Indigenous communities and the role of economics
in political decision-making, ANWR illustrates both the legal dynamics at play and the humandimension of the relationship between Indigenous communities and the extractive resource
industry.
ANWR is a plot of land on the North Slope of Alaska.4 The Gwich’in peoples have lived
and relied upon the nearly 10 million acres of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the
surrounding lands for thousands of years. 5 This sacred land is central to Gwich’in culture, as is
their relationship with the many other species that live there, particularly the Porcupine Caribou
Herd. The caribou herd is an integral part of the Gwich’in peoples’ existence and identity, and
and plays an important role in their subsistence lifestyle and self-sufficiency, in addition to their
Indigenous cultural traditions. In other words, the healthy and vitality of the Porcupine Herd is a
determining factor in the Gwich’in peoples’ ability to exercise full self-determination.
The Gwich’in call the Coastal Plain “Iizhik Gwats’an Gwandaii Goodlit,” or “The
Sacred Place Where Life Begins.”6 This name correlates to the facts that the area is directly
along the migratory path of the caribou herd and the calving grounds for the Porcupine Herd are
within the Coastal Plain. The Coastal Plain is called the “biological heart” of the refuge for its
life-sustaining qualities and its significance in the wider habitat which also makes it a
particularly sacred and important site. 7 There are also fifteen Gwich’in villages and nearly nine
thousand Gwich’in people living along the migratory path of the caribou herd.8
For four decades, the oil and gas industry has threatened this sacred relationship and the
survival of the Gwich’in peoples by attempting to gain access to the resources in ANWR,
particularly along the Coastal Plain. 9 Oil and gas development in ANWR, including seismic
testing and exploration, would be detrimental to the ecosystem of the entire refuge, but especially
so to the Coastal Plain and the Porcupine Caribou Herd.10 In their role as stewards and protectors
of the land, the Gwich’in Nation has been fighting this attempted exploitation in a series of legal
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and political battles. These battles are rooted in Alaskan state law and federal Indian policies in
the US.
In fact, the foundation of Indigenous rights in Alaska began in 1867, when William H.
Seward orchestrated the purchase of Alaska for $7.2 million from Russia and the US became a
coastal Arctic nation. 11 At the time, the purchase was labeled Seward’s Folly, and for many years
people questioned why the US had spent millions of dollars on a distant ‘icebox.’ However
public perceptions began to shift in the late 1800s during the gold rush era. By the beginning of
the 20th century, the importance of Alaska to US energy development and foreign policy had
grown rapidly.12’a
The Arctic sections of Alaska are the North Slope borough, the Northwest Arctic
borough, and the Nome borough; occasionally parts of the Yukon-Koyukuk borough are
included in this category.13 There are estimated to be around 30,000 people living in the Alaskan
Arctic about 16,000 of whom are Alaska Native. 14’ 15 Alaska Natives are commonly grouped into
eleven distinct cultures in geographic categories: the Eyak, Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian peoples
who live in the Southeast; the Inupiaq and St. Lawrence Island Yupik who live in the north and
northwest parts of Alaska (Arctic); Yup’ik and Cup’ik Alaska Natives who live in southwest
Alaska; the Athabascan peoples who live in Alaska’s interior (subarctic); and the Alutiiq
(Sugpiaq) and Unangax peoples who live in south-central Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.16
During the purchase and the subsequent settlement of Alaska, the US government failed
to consult the many Indigenous peoples living in the area, despite the fact that they had lived on
the land for a millennium.17 The native people of Alaska were originally denied American
citizenship; it wasn’t until 1924 with the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act in the US Senate
that Alaska Natives gained this recognition. 18 In 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANSCA) finally began to establish substantive policy on Alaska Native affairs and rights. 19
ANSCA transferred 43.7 million acres of land and $962.5 million in compensation for the
renunciation of any additional Alaska Native claims to territorial lands. 20 The act created 13
regional corporations and over 200 village corporationsb with each corporation receiving land
and money to administer federal and state health, housing, and other services in each region.

a

US interests in Alaska will be elaborated on later in this chapter.
The distinction between regional versus village corporations is important as they hold different legal and political
rights which will be explored more in the next chapter.
b
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Each enrolled Native became a shareholder in their respective region. 21 ANSCA is a federal
policy but structurally it operates primarily under state law and the regional and village
corporations fall under the corporate law of Alaska. 22 Regional corporations must all be forprofit. While village corporations have the choice to be either for-profit or non-profit operations,
all have opted to be for-profit as well.23 Many of these regional and village corporations have
partner non-profits many of which are focused on cultural preservation. 24 These non-profits often
depend on funding from the Native corporations to function. The for-profit nature of these
Native corporations means that making profits to distribute to their shareholders is the primary
purpose of each organization. 25 This profit-focused purpose can lead to a paradox where money
objectives conflict with the organizations’ goals to support cultural preservation because they
may require the corporations to develop and exploit their valuable natural resources 26 and this
advancing development that may negatively affect their other cultural preservation work, for
example, through environmental degradation.
Another important piece of ANSCA was its differentiation between rights afforded to the
regional and village corporations. This distinction is particularly important in ANWR.
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This map depicts ANWR, outlining the jurisdictional setting and land rights.c
ANSCA gave the Kaktovik Iñupiat Native village Corporation surface rights to 69,000
acres within the range.27Other Native regional corporations were entitled to subsurface mining
rights, but at the time the range’s regulations held that native oil development claims were not
included. It is also important to recognize that, according the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), when there are split estate situations (like a Native village owning surface rights and the
federal government or a Native regional corporation possessing subsurface rights), the mineral
rights or subsurface rights are considered dominant. This owning group has precedence in
property ownership, although they must show consideration for the interests of the surface
owners and use only the surface land necessary for development.28 ANWR development was
also impacted by the passage of the Arctic National Interest Lands Conservation Act in 1980
which extended ANWR south and west by 9.2 million acres of public domain lands and
designated 8 million acres of the original land as a Wilderness Area while leaving the 1.57
million acre Coastal Plain out of the Wilderness Area protection. This decision came only after
substantial public debate and required that the Coastal Plain be studied by the Department of the
Interior (DOI) for energy development and resource purposes. Effectively, oil and gas
exploratory activity were permitted with actual development decisions to be made in the
future.29’30 However, Section 1003 of the 1980 Act mandates that oil and natural gas production
or leasing and other development in the Refuge are prohibited unless authorized by an act of
Congress.31 The ANWR conversation was further complicated in 1983, with the passage of the
Chandler Lake Agreement. This agreement was between the federal government and the Arctic
Slope Regional Corporation (ASCR) based on changes that were made in ANILCA that gave the
Kaktovik Iñupiat Corporation (KIC) more land area surface rights in the Coastal Plain. 32 The
agreement gave the ASRC subsurface rights to the KIC lands with the rule that development
would be prohibited unless Congress opened up the ANWR.33 Consequently, ASRC has
precedence over the native KIC lands with the condition that Congress has to authorize any
development, despite the original ANSCA rulings.
The ANWR discussion has involved many decades of conflict, but part of the core
tension is disagreement between the various Native villages, corporations, communities, and
c

Encyclopedia Britannica
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people involved over the nature and timing of resource development. The Gwich’in, who
primarily live in villages just south of the Refuge, have deeply significant ties to and subsistence
dependence upon the land, Caribou, and Coastal Plain. The Kaktovik Iñupiat people live on an
island on the North Slope of the Refuge and are not as dependent on the caribou herd, as they
also have bowhead whale, and they have recently benefitted greatly from oil and gas
development taxes unlike the Gwich’in who have no access to whale or to money from oil and
gas development.34’35 These differences between the two groups in livelihood, culture, and
location have led to serious conflict in priorities. The Gwich’in have wanted to protect ANWR
from development and the Iñupiat people in Kaktovik have not wanted to restrict economic
opportunities that could significantly benefit their community. 36 The differences in rights
afforded to each village corporation and their relationship to regional corporations has given this
cultural tension grounding in law and policy and exemplifies the complexity of Indigenous rights
in the Arctic.
Outside of ANWR, there are numerous other locations of current drilling and potential
energy development in the Alaskan Arctic, which provide important context to US Arctic policy.
The National Petroleum Reserve (NPR-A) is a nearly 23 million acre plot of land on the North
Slope of Alaska (just west of ANWR), which is owned by the federal government. 37 In 2019,
drilling in the Reserve generated more than $56 million in oil and gas lease revenue. 38 There are
a number of conflicts surrounding abandoned federal legacy wells on the Reserve and
discussions of Indigenous rights for the nearby Iñupiat peoples as there are over 40 Indigenous
communities in the region that depend on the water, wildlife, and other resources supported by
the reserve.39 There are also eight North Slope Borough communities that are located in or
adjacent to the reserve which complicate questions and discussions over management and
rights.40
Another important location is Prudhoe Bay, one of the largest and most politically and
economically significant oilfields in US history. From the mid to late 20th century, oil
development in the region contributed to the US’s efforts to transition from dependence on
foreign oil after the 1973 oil crisis with the Middle East and although in decline, the region is
still producing oil.41 Even more, oil development in Prudhoe Bay also mandated the construction
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System which connects the oil fields with ports on the Southern
coast of Alaska.42 The pipeline was controversial due to environmental concerns and because it
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had to be built on large sections of land owned by Native Alaskans who often opposed its
development.43 The political import of the 1973 oil crisis and the high US demand for oil
eventually overrode these voices and concerns, and negotiations with Native villages and the
passage of the 1973 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act by President Nixon cleared the
way for the construction of the pipeline. 44 There are currently discussions of a plan for another
pipeline for liquified natural gas [LNG] from the North Slope of Alaska to Fairbanks. However
President Biden’s recent infrastructure bill did not allot the project the nearly $4 billion it needs
to begin so plans remain uncertain. 45
US Arctic policy also extends beyond Alaska and into the rest of the region, primarily in
relation to three sectors: security, energy, and the environment. In World War II, Alaska’s
location close to the action in the Pacific became strategically important, which triggered the
construction of the Alaskan Highway. 46 The state’s proximity to the Soviet Union—it was the
shortest route for a potential nuclear attack—was also critical and the US constructed a vast
network of early warning systems across the Arctic involving Alaska, Canada, and Greenland
and invested heavily in polar research for the purpose of security.47 This US militarization of the
Arctic increased during the Cold War, particularly in Greenland where the US basically
constructed and controlled a military colony. 48 This security and military framework has been
reimagined in US policy as “domain awareness,” which concerns the protection of maritime
commerce, critical infrastructure, and other key resources (particularly fossil fuels). 49 These
Arctic domain concerns are growing as ice melts and the Arctic Ocean opens up which creates
more controversy over rights of passage and sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean, including
jurisdictional rights to resources and their development, and rules to protect environmental
interests in the region.50
Another important force shaping US Arctic policy is the nation’s historic and continuing
attitude toward multi-lateral cooperation. In the past, the US was reluctant to join binding multilateral agreements in the Arctic and was opposed to the formation of an international legal
organization in the region. This hesitance came largely from a desire to refrain from hard law
commitments and in particular, to avoid any sort of military obligation or restriction. 51 This led
to tension with other Arctic nations over management and international collaboration, a genuine
problem since the US will always be a powerful player in the Arctic arena. 52 This initial
reluctance to cooperate in the Arctic in formal legal structures has since subsided and the US had
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been involved in a number of initiatives and collaborative efforts, most notably, the Arctic
Council.53’d

Canada: Uranium Mining in Nunavut and Land Claims Agreements
Similar to the United States, Canada has many vested interests in the North. Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau has articulated these four main objectives as: conservation of Arctic
biodiversity, collaboration with Indigenous peoples and inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge into
decision-making, building a sustainable Arctic economy (including shipping, fisheries, and oil
and gas development), and supporting Arctic communities and promoting resilience. 54
Correlating to these publicized priorities and the analysis provided in this section, I judged that
the nature of domestic regulations and legislative support for Indigenous rights in Canada is
adequate to well-established, that the importance of resource extraction in the region to the
nation is adequate, and that the overall status and ability to exercise self-determination of land
and cultural rights for the Indigenous communities in the state is adequate.
The nation has a strong connection to its Arctic identity. The Canadian North
encompasses 75% of the nation’s national coastlines and 40% of the its land mass. 55 The myth of
‘the great white North’ is the recurrent romanticization of Canada’s northern identity and
exemplifies the nation’s tendency to associate national pride with ‘Arctic exceptionalism.’ 56
Three Canadian territories are in the Arctic circle—Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and
Nunavut—and northern sections of other provinces are also Arctic. The Northwest Territories
and Nunavut are majority Indigenous, while Yukon is majority white, and of the nearly 150,000
people that live in the Canadian Arctic, more than half are Indigenous.57 The Gwich’in and
Athabascan peoples live primarily in Yukon and the Northwest Territories, while the Inuit live in
Inuit Nunangat which encompasses four distinct Inuit regions: the Inuvialuit Settlement Region
(ISR) in the Northwest territories, the territory of Nunavut in the eastern Arctic, Nunavik in
northern Quebec and Nunatsiavut in northern Labrador in the province of Newfoundland and
Labrador.58’59 Canada’s Indigenous peoples are divided into three categories—First Nations
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The Arctic Council and the role of the United States in the organization will be discussed in depth in the next
chapter.
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(including the Gwich’in and Athabaskan peoples), Inuit, and Métis (of mixed Indigenous and
European ancestry), and they each have a distinct cultural and legal identity. 60
Extractive industry in the Canadian Arctic has an interesting and complicated past.
Developers have mined for gold, diamonds, nickel, and lead-zinc and have explored for oil,
uranium, and natural gas, among other extractive exploits. 61 The development of the uranium
industry, in particular, offers a compelling look into how Indigenous rights and the legal and
legislative history of Canada relate to extractive industry in the Arctic.
Conflicts over uranium mining in the region date back to the 1970s with the proposed
Kiggavik uranium mine in Baker Lake in the Kivalliq region of Nunavut.62 In 1974, the Inuit of
Baker Lake (Qamani’tuaq) submitted a petition in the federal court to halt new mining activities
in the area, including uranium exploration, based largely on concerns for the caribou herds who
depended upon those lands. 63 The Inuit Tarpirisat Canada (ITC) e filed a similar proposal in 1975
but both were rejected.64 In 1977, they did succeed in passing a temporary injunction on the
issuance of land use permits in the region, but operations continued for existing permit holders.65
The Inuit tried to extend this measure in 1978, requesting continuance of the ban, but the petition
was rejected.66 A collective of Inuit—including the Hamlet of Baker Lake, the Baker Lake
Hunters and Trappers Organization (HTO), and the ITC—then filed litigationf to have the
injunction on new land use permits reinstated. A judge set a temporary injunction on new permits
until the trial concluded and made a final judgement in favor of the Inuit and an interim freeze on
the issuance of land use permits. 67 The ruling was based largely on the dependence of the Inuit of
Baker Lake on the caribou and their ‘special relationship’ to the herd g—recognizing that the
Baker Lake Inuit do not have access to marine mammals which heightens the importance of the
caribou in their lives.68 After the case went to trial though, the judge ruled that, while the Inuit
continued to possess some form of Aboriginal title to the region, the area surrounding Baker
Lake was considered “public lands” and thus subject to the Canadian Mining Regulations.69 In
addition, he ordered the temporary injunction be terminated due to a lack of sufficient evidence
proving that exploration activities were harming the caribou herds. 70
e

The ITC is the non-profit political body that represents the Inuit of Canada. It was formed in 1971. The state that
their mission is to "serve as a national voice protecting and advancing the rights and interests of Inuit in Canada.”
(https://www.itk.ca/national-voice-for-communities-in-the-canadian-arctic/)
f
Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. (1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513
g
The judge in the case—Judge Mahoney—stated that, “the minerals, if there, will remain; the caribou, presently
there, may not.” (Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. (1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513)
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The Inuit in Baker Lake were not unanimously opposed to the mining exploration and
there was internal community conflict over the legal action as well. Some Inuit—both harvesters
and people who worked for the mining companies—argued, in the words of one, that “wildlife
always moves around and will always be there and there is nothing to be concerned about.”71 At
the same time, there were disagreements over Inuit land claims, specifically regarding the
separation of Nunavut from the Northwest Territories.72 The Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut
(TFN) was created in 1982 to take over these negotiations from the ITC and work with the
Western Arctic Inuvialuit, but the process was challenging and proceeded slowly, largely due to
conflict over issues related to mining. 73
While exploration continued, the TFN began to negotiate land claims agreements. In
1986, the Urangesellschaft Canada Ltd. (UG) released plans for the Kiggavik uranium mine,
which would be located on the post-calving grounds of the Beverly caribou herd. 74 This proposal
led to the formation of a uranium intervention coordinating committee, the Northern AntiUranium Coalition (NAUC), which focused on the health concerns for the community and
caribou herd, in addition to expressing ethical and moral concerns regarding nuclear
development.75 Opposition forces led by the NAUC continued to advocate against uranium
mining and the Kiggavik proposal, while pro-mining and UG forces worked to generate public
support for the project.76 UG also completed and released an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) which was judged by a six-person Federal Environmental Assessment Review Panel
(FEARO, formed in 1989) to be deficient, especially in regard to consideration for social
impacts; UG was required to revise it.77 There were numerous criticisms about the lack of Inuit
participation and representation in this processes, both in the development of the EIS and from
the governmental regulatory side where Inuit felt decisions were being made without their
input.78 In 2003, there was a public vote held on the future of the Kiggavik project, with 90% of
the voters (which was 76% of the eligible voting population) opposing the mine. This resulted in
UG indefinitely suspending the project. 79
In the midst of this conflict, there was a larger trend across the Canadian North regarding
Indigenous rights and lands claims which impacted the outcome of the Kiggavik proposal. First,
there was the 1973 Calder v. British Columbia case in the Canadian Supreme Court which
resulted in a split ruling that stated that Aboriginal title exists in this contemporary setting,
despite the 1763 Royal Proclamation (or later, the early treaties) that had ceded these rights. 80 In
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addition, in the 1970s, the Mackenzie Valley Gas and Pipeline Project in Fort Good Hope in the
Northwest Territories played a critical role in the development of the Canadian lands claims
system.81 While the Dene people of the region were split on support for the pipeline, there was
vocal opposition from those who objected. This prompted former British Columbia justice,
Thomas Bergerh, to write and release the “Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland” report. 82 The
1977 report, called the Berger Inquiry, encouraged the federal government to restart treaty
negotiations which would form the basis of modern Canadian Indigenous law. 83 The report
called for a 10-year moratorium on pipeline development in order to allow time for land claims
to be settled, thus prompting specific discussions over land, resource, and mineral rights and
development.84 In addition, in 1982, Canada gave constitutional protection to Indigenous
peoples’ rights to their territories—which can include land as well as sea and coastline—through
section 35 of the Constitution Act. 85
Following the Berger Inquiry, the Calder case, and the constitutional changes, there were
five new agreements signed in the 1970s-90s; most notable for this paper was the Nunavut
Agreement was signed in 1993. 86 In the agreement, the Inuit received $1.14 billion, title to about
18% of Nunavut, with mineral rights over 2% of the territory, and a number of specified rights
and commitments to political developments, like the creation of new political bodies, in
exchange for agreeing to ‘cede, release, and surrender’i their aboriginal rights (title) to land to
the Crown.87 The new political organizations created were the Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated
(NTI)—the primary legal body by which Inuit rights are exercised—and three regional
organizations (RIAs)—the Kivalliq Inuit Association (KIA), the Qikiqtani Inuit Organization
(QIA), and the Kitikmeot Inuit Association (KitIA). 88
The breakdown of land classifications is important to the exercise of Inuit extraction
rights. Most of the land—about 80%—are Crown Lands, which means they owned and managed
by the federal government, which also collects royalties from energy resource extraction. 89 Of
those royalties, only 50% of the first $2 million and 5% yearly of any further royalties are shared
with the NTI.90 The remaining 20% of the land is Inuit-owned (IOL) but, due to the fact that
h

Berger had argued the famous Aboriginal title Calder case at the Supreme Court of Canada. (Kulchyski, P.,
Bernauer, W., 2014, “Modern Treaties, Extraction, and Imperialism in Canada’s North: Two Case Studies.” pg. 16.)
i
This ‘surrender’ was called the ‘extinguishment clause’ and its inclusion in these early modern treaties was highly
criticized and the later modern treaties instead have a ‘certainty’ clause which modifies the Aboriginal rights and
title of Indigenous signatories instead of extinguishing them. (Bernauer, W., 2019, “Land Rights and Resource
Conflicts in Nunavut.” Polar Geography 42(4), pg. 255.)
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Inuit have mineral rights only over 2% of the land, rather than create an effective and meaningful
way to spread power and resource benefits, this system has instead complicated the Inuit
relationship to extraction.91 The role of Inuit Impact and Benefits Agreements (IIBAs) and the
federal royalty regime contributed to this complex dynamic. Contrary to what Inuit negotiators
had originally assumed would be the case j, the federal government said the IIBAs only applied to
IOLs.92 Thus, the Inuit were left with a poor federal royalty regime and limited ability to use the
IIBA system so they became more dependent upon extraction within the IOLs. 93 The IOLs were
also primarily historic camping and hunting locations—areas with cultural and subsistence
significance—because they were the lands Inuit prioritized in negotiation before they realized
these would also be the lands they depended upon for extractive resources.94 As a result, there
has been increased conflict over extraction in important areas, for example, the tension over
uranium mining in caribou territory as discussed above.95
After creation, the Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) and the Kivalliq Inuit Association
(KIA) were originally opposed to uranium mining in Nunavut and the Kiggavik project, yet in
the early 2000s this began to change. There was a huge increase in the price of uranium and, as
the industry gained more traction both regionally and globally, a Canadian subsidiary of the
French company that had acquired the Kiggavik mine in the 90s—AREVA Resources—began to
reengage the Kiggavik project. 96 In 2005, NTI commissioned a consulting firm to prepare a
paper concerning uranium policy options. 97 The paper was very pro-uranium development,
emphasizing the safety, the supposed greenness of nuclear energy in the face of climate change,
and economic benefits, in addition to including a draft policy in support of uranium mining. 98
The paper also claimed that the Inuit had already invested in the cause because many of the IOLs
had high mineral/uranium potential. Moreover, uranium mining in the region was basically
inevitable because the Inuit had no ability to restrict or ban it on Crown lands or IOL surface
lands.k’99 In response, the NTI and KIA began entering into agreements with uranium
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Inuit negotiators had assumed the IIBAs would provide the most effective route to exercising rights and getting the
monetary benefits of extraction because the federal royalty regime was “lean”—thus, rather than try to negotiate
through the federal royalty system, they invested their time and energy in supporting the IIBAs. (Bernauer, W.,
2019, “Land Rights and Resource Conflicts in Nunavut.” Polar Geography 42(4), pg. 257.)
k
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companiesl, uranium exploration began once again, and a new grassroots opposition
organizationm was formed by residents from Iqaluit and Baker Lake. 100
AREVA submitted a new proposal for the Kiggavik mine in 2008 to the Nunavut Impact
Review Board (NIRB) and a full environmental review began in 2009, with final hearings taking
place in 2015.101 There was significant opposition from many in the communities—residents, the
Baker Lake HTO, Makita, among others—yet, the presentations from NTI and KIA did not
reflect these concerns. 102 The NIRB report—released in May 2015—recommended that the
project not be approved, primarily due to concerns over the project timeline and allowed
AREVA the opportunity to re-submit its proposal when it was able to provide more certainty
over the project timeline and start date. 103
Much of the conflict in this debate and the more general tension over extractive
industry/uranium mining and Inuit/Indigenous rights is rooted in the 1993 Nunavut Agreement
and the ‘extinguishment clause.’ Rather than hold Aboriginal title to these lands, which would
have provided for exclusive control and benefit from them, the Inuit had to settle for piecemeal
and limited ownership of their territorial lands and resources.104 This narrative holds true in
issues across the Canadian Arctic and in sub-Arctic First Nations communities and is further
complicated by the nature of Canadian politics, governance, and Arctic priorities.
The governance and sovereignty system across the Canadian Arctic is complex and in
each territory there are distinct legal and political considerations to take into account. For an
example related to the issue of uranium mining and the Nunavut Agreement, of the three
territories, Yukon was the first, and for many years the only, one to be granted administrative
control over its land and resources. 105’n This means that the Yukon government was given
legislative control over the surface and subsurface resources in its territory, including jurisdiction
over the waters.106 The Yukon government signed The Yukon Northern Development Affairs
Program Devolution Transfer Agreement (DTA) in 2003 with the Government of Canada. The
Northwest Territories did not receive similar rights until 2014, at which point Nunavut also
began negotiations with the federal government for administrative control of their territory. 107 It
l

Including an agreement that created a new uranium exploration company, Kivalliq Energy, which included NTI as
a shareholder (Bernauer, W., 2019, “Land Rights and Resource Conflicts in Nunavut.” Polar Geography 42(4), pg.
259.)
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Nunavummiut Makitagunarningit (‘Makita’ in short) (Bernauer, W., 2019, “Land Rights and Resource Conflicts in
Nunavut.” Polar Geography 42(4), pg. 259.)

57

has been argued that the fact that Yukon had territorial control over a decade earlier than the
other Arctic territories is indicative of systemic discrimination against Indigenous peoples in the
Canadian government.108 Natural resource rights are crucial to Indigenous self-determination
and, particularly within Nunavut, they are critical to expansion of sovereignty.
Inuit Nunangat has various levels of sovereignty and is currently experimenting with
dynamic forms of self-rule and self-government. Nunavut has the most autonomy as it has status
as a territory in the Canadian federal system, but each of the three other distinct regions
mentioned earlier (the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR) in the Northwest territories, Nunavik
in northern Quebec, and Nunatsiavut in northern Labrador in the province of Newfoundland and
Labrador) hold varying levels of self-rule and rights.109 Nunavut was created in 1999, after the
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement of 1993 led to the division of the Northwest Territories. 110 As
was noted, the movement towards making land claims agreements in Canada was spurred in the
1960s and 70s after the growth of Indigenous sovereignty and governance authority around the
Arctic (particularly in Alaska and Greenland). 111 Originally, provisions for self-government were
not included in these agreements, yet by the 1990s, clauses on development of self-rule and
governance were permitted within land claims agreements. 112 The variation along the timeline, as
well as the legal distinctions between territories, provinces, and regional and local governance
structures means that there is a diverse spectrum of self-rule across the Arctic, particularly within
Inuit Nunangat.113 There are Inuit actors at each level and stage of government and the Inuit
arguably have more rights of self-determination than the First Nations peoples of Canada, as they
are not subject to the same constrictive federal Indian Act. 114 Yet, it can be argued that despite
these Inuit self-rule institutions, the Inuit are still constrained by the overarching federal system
in Canada. Their territorial rights are sometimes lacking in substance as the federal government
will not relinquish natural resource rights because they depend upon the revenue. 115
Similar to the US, Canada has interest in off-shore oil development and other energy
resources in the Arctic, in addition to concerns about security, environmental protection, climate
change, shipping, tourism, and international cooperation and collaboration on all manner of
Arctic issues and topics. This wide array of interests can be beneficial to the Indigenous peoples
of the region because it creates a platform for and generates increased attention towards their
voices and issues. However, the range of involved actors can dilute their interests in favor of
those of the federal government/outsiders. Shipping and transit in the Northwest Passage is a
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great example of this, even though it does not relate directly to extractive industry. The
Northwest Passage is a strait connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans which runs through the
Arctic and along the Northern Coast of Canada and the US.116
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is widely acknowledged to be the
primary legal framework governing sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Arctic and thus the
Northwest Passage.117 Both Canada and the US o agree that UNCLOS is applicable to the
Northwest Passage and other sea routes in the region, yet they disagree over how the norms
should be interpreted and applied. Canada believes that the waters of the Northwest Passage are
internal waters based either on the use of a straight baseline system for distinguishing between
internal waters and the territorial sea or on their status as “historic waters.” p118 If these waters are
considered internal to Canada, the nation would have nearly full sovereignty over them. 119 On
the other hand, the US and the European Union believe that, because of the nature of navigation
in the region, the waters should be considered international straits with rights of transit passage
which would then limit the ability of Canada to regulate foreign shipping. 120 This disagreement
is complex legally and politically because it is one of the few major disputes between the two
Arctic powers (the US and Canada). However, the issue is not a lack of applicable law but how
the law should be applied to these waters.

o

It is important to note though that the US is still not party to the convention which alters the enforceability and
applicability of UNCLOS norms slightly.
p
The issue is made even more interesting and relevant to this paper by the fact that part of Canada’s argument for
historic waters hinges upon Indigenous occupation and use of the land on a historical and contemporary basis.
(Baldassarri, E. “Sovereignty” in exhibition The Northwest Passage: Myth, Environment, and Resources by
Environment and Society.)
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This map depicts the Northwest Passage and highlights the disputed maritime claims between
Canada and the United States.q
The Inuit homeland—Inuit Nunangat—stretches across much of the coast. 121 In the past,
Canada relocated Indigenous communities to unpopulated areas in order to claim sovereignty
over more of the Arctic. They are now using the same approach to claim sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage through a historic waters argument.122 The Inuit also have a claim—although
not under UNCLOS—to partial sovereignty over the region through the application of the UN
Declaration of Indigenous Rights (UNDRIP), which Canada has ratified, and Canadian land
claims agreements. 123 For the Inuit, this issue is about more than just internal waters vs. transit
rights.124 The melting of the ice and climate change more broadly has an immense impact of the
way of life for communities and puts many strains on aspects of self-determination—including

q
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access to subsistence resources, safety in travel and infrastructure, cultural preservation,
economic stability, and health among others—and Inuit people and their advocates have issued a
number of statements on Indigenous rights, sovereignty, and self-determination in the
region.125’126 In particular, in 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council adopted a document titled, “A
Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic.”127 The declaration is divided into
four sections: Inuit and the Arctic; The Evolving Nature of Sovereignty in the Arctic; Inuit, the
Arctic and Sovereignty: Looking Forward; and A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty
in the Arctic.128 Each section has sub-clauses supporting the primary assertions and these range
from statements that, “Inuit are an Indigenous people of the Arctic” to ones that discuss “the
need for global cooperation.”129 Very significantly, the declaration makes important points about
sovereignty and self-determination for Indigenous peoples in the Arctic. First, they assert the
need for new forms of sovereignty—they claim that the old perception of sovereignty is breaking
down and creative ways are emerging to better recognize the rights of people. 130 Second, the
declaration states that issues of Arctic Indigenous sovereignty must be viewed in the context of
their long struggle to gain “recognition and respect” and to have the right to exercise selfdetermination over their lives, territories, cultures, and languages.131 The declaration also
recognizes that this right to self-determination is developing in numerous different ways and at
different paces across the Arctic states. 132 Regardless of this inconsistent and incongruous
progress, the ICC declares that these developments will nonetheless still provide a foundation for
the formation of creative governance systems in the future. 133 This broad-level development will
continue deepening the support and recognition for self-determination norms within international
law. This declaration is also a hugely significant assertion of Indigenous rights by Indigenous
peoples, further proving that Indigenous advocates have a decisive role in the normative
development and advancement of Indigenous self-determination.
The Northwest Passage offers another look at the immense complexity of Arctic issues,
bringing up discussions of how law/legal frameworks, jurisdiction/sovereignty, environmental
change/climate, and Indigenous rights/self-determination play into the ever-shifting nature of
geopolitical and socio-cultural considerations. It also points out the holes in the current legal
frameworks in the Arctic, thus further highlighting the need for change and evolution in Arctic
policy and governance.
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Russia: Mining in the North
Russia encompasses far more Arctic territory than any other nation—this is clear when
looking at a map—and has a strong connection to its Arctic identity and reliance on the resources
provided by the region. Russia’s focuses in the North are energy and power. 134 The nation
invests in these objectives through both extensive extraction and frequent demonstration of
power (in infrastructure development and politically).135 The nation has also prioritized the
development of the Northern Sea Route and the opening of shipping in the Arctic. r136 Based on
these realities and the analysis in this section I believe that the nature of domestic regulations and
legislative support for Indigenous rights in Russia is minimal, that the importance of resource
extraction in the region to the nation is well-established, and that the overall status and ability to
exercise self-determination of land and cultural rights for the Indigenous communities in the
state is minimal.
Resource extraction is the primary focus of Russian Arctic policy as Arctic resources
contribute eleven percent of the national income of Russia and twenty two percent of Russian
exports.137 This includes off-shore drilling for oil and gas/LNG, as well as mining for nickel and
other metals, which all occurs within the centralized Russian economy. 138 These activities greatly
impact the Indigenous peoples of the region who, more so than the Indigenous peoples of any
other Arctic nation, are without rights or power to advocate for their own interests.
There are considered to be twenty-six Indigenous ethnic groups in the North of Russia,
typically referred to as the “small peoples” or “small numbered peoples” of the north.139 They
have lived in the region since time immemorial. While the traditions and cultures between
groups vary, their primary traditional occupations are hunting, trapping, fishing, and reindeer
herding.140 The Soviet/Russian attitudes towards the Indigenous peoples has shifted over the
years and their approach to Arctic assimilation varied throughout the 20th century, with
Indigenous peoples serving different functions over the nearly 70 years of Soviet and Russian
rule.141 Overall, as the Soviet Union looked to industrialize and conquer the Far North, their
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They are working with China to further develop the NSR and shipping in the Arctic. (Lantiegne, M., 2017, “’Have
you entered the storehouses of the snow?’ China as a norm entrepreneur in the Arctic.” Polar Record 53(269), pg.
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efforts were often challenged by Indigenous groups in numerous ways.142 First, Indigenous
groups presented a barrier to smooth Soviet/Russian occupation of the North due to the
complicated and changing state of sovereignty and autonomy through regime changes in the 20th
century and the repeatedly evolving tensions surrounding colonial intentions and the value of
ethnic preservation under socialism. 143 In addition, the basic failures of the attempted cultural
assimilation and creation of unified Soviet identity in Indigenous peoples and the unmeetable
expectations and demands for Indigenous resources from Soviet authorities all contributed to a
sort of Indigenous resistance to Russian conquest in the North.144
These challenges have partially subsided and given way to a new dynamic between the
Russian state and Indigenous peoples. The Russian legal framework typically recognizes four
categories of aboriginal peoples, titular nations (Russians), titular nations (in Republics),
Indigenous minority peoples, and national minorities—only the last two groups receive benefits
from the government, who they are is determined by the government s.145 There are Russian tribal
organizations called obshchinas which have the right to apply to use federal, regional, or locals
territories for traditional nature use. 146 The obshchinas do not own or control the land.147 They
merely have the right to use the land for traditional subsistence activities—like fishing and
hunting and reindeer herding—with the permission of the government or municipality. 148 The
Constitution of the Russian Federation does declare the right to traditional natural resources as an
Indigenous right, yet this does not include a right to extraction or to ownership of the
“subsoil.”149’150
Thus, the rights of Russian Indigenous peoples are distinctly different from those in other
Arctic nations because they have no right of ownership and their level of self-determination is
much lower in many respects. In addition, the approach of the Russian government to Indigenous
relations has been described as ‘paternalistic’ compared to partnership-based, although some
sources argue this dynamic is improving through increased collaboration. 151’152
There are some documented impacts of petroleum extraction in the Nenets Autonomous
District where a notable population of Russian small numbered peoples—in this case, the
s

The only clear requirement considered by the government for a group to be considered Indigenous is population
size—less than 50,000 people—hence the term ‘small numbered.’ There are large ethnic groups who thus do not
meet the categorization of Indigenous despite similar heritage. In addition, as Indigenous groups grow (like the
Nenets), they risk losing their Indigenous status in the future. (Sidorova, E., 2015. “Extractive Leviathon: The role
of the government in the relationships between oil and gas and Indigenous communities in the Arctic regions of
Canada, the United States, and Russia.” A thesis at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, pg. 93.)
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Nenets—reside. First, oil drilling can be detrimental to the environment and wildlife—which are
important resources the practice of cultural activities like reindeer herding which are the one way
the Indigenous peoples can exercise their Indigeneity and rights. 153 These include: oil spillages,
industrial waste pollution, and impact to the fish and plant populations and reindeer migration. 154
In addition, there are negative impacts from a social perspective, including increased rates of
alcoholism, drug and substance abuse, and violence against women.155 There are also positive
impacts that have been documented as a result of petroleum extraction in the region. For
example, there has been improvement of communication and transport, increased demand for
reindeer meat from the oil workers, and more jobs for those Nenets who were eligible. There are
also opportunities—materially, financially, and in networking—for local farms, including
reindeer herding enterprises, from the petroleum industry.156’157 Notably, there are no direct
benefits from petroleum extraction in the Nenets Autonomous District or any other of these
territories because the Indigenous groups do not have ownership or mineral rights.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to analyze these issues from the perspective of the
Indigenous peoples because the Russian state closely polices this information. t However, some
information has been leaked and people have spoken out.u For example, there has been criticism
of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON)—the Russian
Permanent Participant group in the Arctic Council which is intended to represent Indigenous
peoples from Russia and ensure that their voices and interests are heard and advocated for on the
international stage.158 Critics argue that RAIPON is acting as an agent of the Russian state and
not accurately representing the interests of the Russian Arctic Indigenous peoples. 159 They claim
that RAIPON is not representing Indigenous interests, particularly in relation to issues of natural
resource development.160
This systemic oppression of the small numbered peoples of the north is made worse by
the immense economic importance to Russian of Artic resources. Beyond this, the Arctic still has
significant meaning to the Russian military and the nation as an arena of Russian exploitation
and power. Russian leader Vladimir Putin considers extraction of raw materials and industrial
growth as the foundation of Russia’s superpower status and as a symbol of Arctic power, 161
t

An exception to this lack of information is the book Arctic Mirrors, written by Yuri Slezkine, which is the most
extensive discussion of Indigenous matters and Russian relations that I have seen.
u
Most notably, Pavel Sulyandziga, who is a former Arctic Council participant from the Russian Association of
Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and currently lives in Maine, has spoken out.
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which Russia is happy to demonstrate by showing off Russian icebreakers and engaging in other
geopolitical acts. A good example occurred in 2007, when Russia sent a mission led by Artur
Chilingarov to Lomonosov Ridge at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean and planted a Russian
flag.162 The act was a symbolic reinforcement of Russia’s claims over new Arctic territories and
its desire to control the Northern Sea Route for shipping and petroleum resources. v
Russian Arctic history largely began in the late 1920s when Stalinist influences and
growing political sentiments in the nation of Soviet global superiority drove the Soviet Union to
focus on expansion and centralization of power. It was during this era that conquest of the Arctic
became a priority.163 As these sentiments expanded and evolved, the Arctic acted as the setting
for the ongoing heroic Soviet myth, largely through exploration, modernization, urbanization,
industrialization, and resource exploitation. 164 There were many challenges in this Arctic
conquest—a difficult climate, economic troubles, and the lack of functional, organized structures
and effective communication are often cited.165 Indigenous peoples also contributed to the
challenges of this conquest but more widely, it is important to acknowledge the role of
Indigenous peoples in this Soviet mission, their impacts on the development of Russian presence
in the Arctic, and the fact that Russian expansion northward involved the assimilation and death
of many Russian Indigenous peoples. 166
Russia’s Arctic superpower status has been challenged by depopulation and an economic
recession which weakens the state’s efforts to bolster industry and development. 167 People are
leaving the primarily industrial cities of the North due to low standards of living and harsh
conditions.168 Russia is also experiencing an economic recession which has significant impact on
development in the North and disproportionately on the small numbered peoples of the region
affected by projects left unfinished, wages lowered, and infrastructure failing.169
Russian development in the Arctic, particularly in extractive industry, also has a
documented past of environmental degradation. The fragile ecosystem of the Arctic has not
responded well to their massive icebreakers, oil spills, and extensive infrastructure
development.170 The people, especially the already disadvantaged Indigenous people, suffer
greatly from this Russian neglect both due to loss of livelihood and land, but also to health
concerns from exposure to heavy metals, dangerous wastes (including nuclear), and chemicals
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and pesticides.171 The case of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO) depicts the
degradation of these activities, most specifically oil spills, on lands and waters in the region and
portrays a community both hurt by how the environmental damages impact their livelihoods and
cultures (namely, reindeer herding) and partially benefitting from the economic, industrial
growth.172 There is significant regional and international controversy over these environmental
and health concerns and this broader dynamic. Overall, Russia’s conservative policies on climate
change/conservation and Putin’s attitude tend to stir geopolitical tensions. 173

Greenland: Uranium Mining as an Antidote to Danish Colonization
Greenland is also facing conflict over uranium mining as it relates to Indigenous rights
and self-determination, yet the case is distinctly different because Greenland is exploring Inuit
self-rule with the potential to become the first fully sovereign, majority Indigenous nation. The
90% Inuit nation has been a colony of Denmark since the 1800s, but through a series of laws and
continual advocacy, has gradually gotten closer to independence. In 1979, Greenland went under
‘home rule,’ meaning they received a legislative assembly and executive and gained control of a
few key policy areas, although not including the handling foreign affairs. 174 In 2003, the
Commission on Self-Governance Reportw recommended efforts to advance self-determination
within Greenland, and in 2008 a referendum on self-rule passed. In 2009, the Home-rule
agreement was replaced with the Self-rule agreement,175 which means that Greenland now has
control of the police force, coast guard, court system, although still not defense and security
affairs.176 This referendum also gave Greenland the possibility of future choice to become fully
independent.177
This independence is critically tied to economic growth, both with current rights
regarding development and natural resources, as well as with more long-term economic selfsufficiency.178 Greenland has the option to control natural resource development but it will need
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This statement prompted the Commission’s conclusion: “The Commission shall, on the basis of Greenland’s
present constitutional position and in accordance with the right of self-determination of the people of Greenland
under international law, deliberate and make proposals for how the Greenland authorities can assume further
powers, where this is constitutionally possible. ” (“The Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission’s Report
on Self-Government in Greenland: Executive Summary.” April 2008. pg. 4).
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to finance it. This leads to the primary tension in the discussion of Greenlandic sovereignty,
which is about the country’s economic potential and the challenge of how Greenland will fund
an independent state. 179 Currently, 54% of the expenses in Greenland’s national budget are paid
for through the block grant subsidies from Denmark. 180 Greenland receives the revenues from
natural resource activities in Greenland, unless it is over DKK 75 million in which case 50% of
the revenue goes to Denmark. Greenland is exploring the potential of oil development. If they
pursue this, the first DKK 75 million would go to Greenland and the rest would be evenly split
with Denmark (according to current estimates). 181 Overall, the only real barrier towards complete
sovereignty for Greenland is the need to first achieve economic independence. The nation has
discussed many potential routes, but the only option that is widely considered to be viable is
resource extraction, and in particular, uranium mining.182’x It is well-known that uranium mining
can cause extreme environmental and health damages and thus there is intense conflict over
whether or not this is the right path. 183
Based on this information and analysis, I judged the nature of domestic regulations and
legislative support for Indigenous rights in Greenland as well-established, the importance of
resource extraction in the region to the nation as well-established, and the overall status and
ability to exercise self-determination of land and cultural rights for the Indigenous communities
in the state as well-established. I did make an important caveat that while Greenland has more
functional self-determination than most, it is important to qualify this and recognize that it is still
a colony of Denmark which severely impairs its ability to be well-established.

Norway, Sweden, and Finland: Mining in Sápmi
Sweden, Finland, and Norway often operate together as a block in the international Arctic
setting and many extractive issues are common to two or more of these nations. They do not
always function as a collective—in particular, Norway often has slightly more autonomy—but
this unified action is still relevant. The sharing of interests and issues occurs largely for two
x

There is also discussion of potential economic growth in oil extraction, fisheries expansion (although fisheries
currently already account for 90% of Greenlandic exports), and building new airports (ie. tourism). (Bjorst, L. R.,
2015. “Saving or destroying the local community? Conflicting spatial storylines in the Greenlandic debate on
uranium.” The Extractive Industries and Society 3)
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reasons: first, they are small states that benefit from multilateral action, and second, the territory
of the Sami peoples—the Indigenous peoples of the region—extends across their borders and
into Russia as well.184 The Sami are reindeer-herding peoples with a deep connection to their
traditional homelands and the culture of this subsistence lifestyle. Rights regarding land and
reindeer husbandry are what drive their political, legal, and socioeconomic activity. 185
The effect of these realities is that the Indigeneity of the region transcends national
borders and the development of Indigenous rights in one nation supports similar growth in
another.186 This pattern began in the Sami lands in Norway in late 20th century with the proposal
of a dam on the Alta River.187 The Sami opposed the dam and mobilized against it. While the
dam was ultimately constructed, Sami opposition triggered the creation of the Sami Parliament in
the Government of Norway which formalized and strengthened their Indigenous voice in the
political and legislative processes of Norway.188 This mobilization catalyzed the development of
Sami Parliaments in Sweden and Finland, y as well as international Sami advocacy groups. 189
Based on these cases, I judged the nature of domestic regulations and legislative support
for Indigenous rights in Sami land (recognizing that there are distinction between the three
nations) as adequate, the importance of resource extraction in the region to the nation as adequate
to well-established, and the overall status and ability to exercise self-determination of land and
cultural rights for the Indigenous communities in the state as adequate to well-established.
There are specific conflicts in each nation which illustrate the complexity of the region.
In Norway, there are conflicts over Indigenous rights regarding oil development, which drives
the Norwegian economy and funds the high level of prosperity, and wind mills because they are
both disruptive to Indigenous Sami ways of being and cultural livelihoods. 190’191 The
conversation surrounding the wind mills is particularly complicated because they are generally
considered to be good as they represent sustainability and the fight against climate change. This
is also critically important to the Sami peoples who, as Arctic Indigenous peoples, are
disproportionately impacted by climate change. Yet, the Sami cannot herd reindeer near/on the
same land as the wind mills because studies and research have shown that reindeer will not go
near wind mills and thus the land near wind mills becomes useless for this purpose.192 Even
y

There is a Sami Parliament in Finland but they have fewer protections and receive less political support than the
Sami in Norway and Sweden. ((Coates, S. and Holroyd, C., 2020, “Europe’s North: The Arctic Policies of Sweden,
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more, wind mill projects require infrastructure and road development which would further
impact the migratory paths of the reindeer herds. 193 As a result not only are the Sami people
disproportionately and unfairly impacted by fossil-fuel driven climate change, as they are not the
primary beneficiaries of fossil fuel money and the environmental change in the Arctic impacts
their land and livelihoods, but they also disproportionately suffer from efforts to respond to the
problem. Beyond that they are too often disregarded in decision-making settings.194 This
environmental and natural resource conflict is only one of the many Indigenous-led cases out of
the Sami region.z
In Sweden, there are numerous conflicts surrounding mining and land rights for Sami
peoples. Currently, there are three aspects of the mining approval process that are designed to be
in support of the rights afforded to Sami people under Swedish law and international human
rights law, including the need to balance competing interests, to conduct environmental impact
assessments, and to permit public participation in the decision-making process.195 Unfortunately,
critics argue that these three safeguards fail to protect the interests of the Sami.196 They state that
balancing competing interests does not give due consideration to Sami interests and leads to
infringement upon the Sami way of life, that the environmental impact assessment process lacks
explicit Sami consultations or sufficient considerations for their reindeer husbandry and the
social impacts of mining projects, and that the public “participation” only provides a right to
information and acts as an indirect consultation opportunity with no real impact on approval
decision .197 The role of international law in justifying these claims is significant and will be
further discussed in chapter three. aa

z

For example, in 2020, the Swedish Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Sami group “Girjas Sameby” to uphold the
claim that they have the exclusive right to fishing and hunting in the Girjas reindeer herding areas. This ruling was
based on the concept of urminnes hävd, which translates roughly to “their presence there from time immemorial.”
(Högsta Domstolen [Swedish Supreme Court] (Jan. 23, 2020) Case No. T 853-18 (Decision)). Another example is
the truth commission being formed by the governments of Sweden and Finland to examine the countries’ history of
abuses and their poor treatment of the Sami peoples. (“Scandinavian Nations Creating Commissions to Review
Crimes Against Indigenous People.” ABC News, Nov. 2021.)
aa
In addition, Iceland does not people who are Indigenous to the island, yet the nation still brings relevant cases to
the table regarding environmental and natural resource rights and discussions of layers of sovereignty in the Arctic.
Iceland has a complex military relationship with NATO, as well as with Britain regarding fisheries and economic
jurisdictions. Iceland also has geothermal and hydropower energy potential, as well as the possibility for oil and gas
development in the future. There are also discussions related to climate change, Arctic security, shipping and transit
(port stops in particular), and the potential for Iceland to become an Arctic hub/center as the ice melts and traffic and
attention in the region grows. (Ingimundarson, V. 2020, “Iceland as an Arctic State.” Chp. 16 in The Palgrave
Handbook of Arctic Policy (Springer International Publishing: ProQuest Ebook Central).)
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Conclusion
Each of these case studies presents an in-depth look at how Indigenous rights are
exercised, or not, in extractive industry in the Arctic. Each case is distinct as a result of the
variation in laws and regulations in each nation, in the nature of the extractive resources, and in
the status and role of the Indigenous communities. It is important to note these differences
because they highlight a larger theme—the web of conflicting and interrelated legal frameworks
and policies that impact extraction in the Arctic and the fact that there are no universally
enforced and recognized standards. The table provides a picture of this comparison to visualize
the complexity of the region. Yet, despite these disparities, there are three notable similarities
which are important to emphasize and which correlate to the themes discussed in chapter one.
The first is the recurring role of Indigenous advocacy in the protection and expansion of
Indigenous rights which relates closely to the development of international human rights and the
role of Indigenous voices in the international legal arena as noted in chapter one. From the
Gwich’in Nation in ANWR to the Inuit in Nunavut and Greenland to the Sami across Norway,
Finland, Sweden, and Russia, Indigenous activists have played a crucial part in advancing and
securing rights for their communities on both a local and regional Arctic scale. This activism will
continue to grow in importance in the Arctic and this future will be discussed in the fourth
chapter.
The next similarity is the tendency of governing nations to silence, ignore, and devalue
Indigenous voices and prioritize economic development over Indigenous self-determination.
Repeatedly, nations and white governments choose extraction over conservation, money over
cultural preservation, development over Indigenous ways of being. The holdover of historical
oppression and colonization is evident in this pattern, both in the remaining legal and political
legacy in colonialist governments and in the colonizer-esque, conquest and money-focused
mindset of many of the decision-makers and the public in these nations. In advancing and
protecting Indigenous rights, this pattern will need to be erased and national governments forced
to put Indigenous voices, needs, and values at the forefront of these discussions.
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Finally, there is the complex dynamic between extraction and self-determination. In
particular, self-determination does not mean or require the absence of extraction; it simply means
the ability of Indigenous communities to make the choice whether or not to extract—to consent
or veto the development—and to benefit from the resource development. Indigenous groups are
not always opposed to extraction and the economic benefit of development is sometimes a
needed resource itself. Greenland is a great example of this paradox. This is simply to reiterate
the purpose of self-determination as understood under Anaya’s framework and to reemphasize
the sentiment behind Indigenous rights and sovereignty, important concepts in the rest of the
paper.
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Chapter 3
Indigenous Rights within Arctic Institutions and International Bodies
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In chapter two, Indigenous rights and extractive industry are explored on a case-based,
national level, exposing how local and national policies and practices impact self-determination
and land rights in Indigenous communities. The Arctic presents a unique arena where
international and regional law and governance also play a major role in how Indigenous
communities exercise their voice and rights in regard to extraction. The Arctic is distinctive
because, while typically international law, embodied in documents like UNDRIP and ILO 169, is
not isolated to a region, the role of international law in the Arctic is different from other settings
both structurally and theoretically and there are specific international legal frameworks that are
not applied in other arenas. This chapter will explore these intricacies of international law in the
Arctic, and in particular, will focus on Arctic Council, as well as on UNCLOS and the IMO
Polar Code. The chapter will discuss how the Council presents a new approach to
institutionalizing Indigenous sovereignty and rights, one that partially illustrates Liftin’s ideas of
non-traditional sovereignty and opens the door for the collaboration among various levels of
actors. This chapter will then cover the strengths and limitations of the Council’s current state
and explore potential innovations at the international level that would contribute to norm
development.
** *
There are numerous reasons why the Arctic is special.1 First, because the Arctic was
ignored and viewed as a barren, cold wasteland for so long, it is one of the few areas on the globe
that still has unclaimed territory and is still in the process of being mapped and surveyed in order
to understand the topography of the seabed and distribution of potential resources. Second, the
region has a complex mix of national territories with sovereign land masses and coastlines and
open sea and resources that are shared among the eight Arctic nations and other players across
the globe. Third, the Arctic is rapidly changing. Climate change is occurring three times faster in
the Arctic than the rest of the world and this change, combined with the impact of increased
urbanization and globalization, are putting the environment, infrastructures, and communities in
a state of rapid transformation. 1 For all these reasons, players in the Arctic developed an Arctic
Council to help promote cooperation and collaboration on common issues and interests. This
Council is really what makes the Arctic stand out from other international arenas as it presents
1

It is particularly important to briefly outline how the Arctic is different from Antarctica—the major difference is
that Antarctica is uninhabited by humans (except scientists) and there is not a convergence of nations with territory
in region nor is it rich in mineral resources, thus it is not nearly as complicated politically or socio-culturally.
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one of the only illustrations of governance and policy-creation in a non-traditional, yet
simultaneously sovereignty-based system.
The idea of the Arctic Council was first formally discussed in the late 20th century
following former President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev’s calls for circumpolar
cooperation. 2 In World War II, the Arctic had been the location of important military operations
for both the Allies and Axis powers, operations that included weather, radio, and other
monitoring stations 2.3 During the Cold War, the Arctic was peripheral to much of the conflict,
yet still held value for intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons due to its proximity
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 4 In Svalbard, the Norwegians and Russians had
to coexist and cooperate and in 1973, the US and the USSR created a cooperative conservation
regime with the 1973 Polar Bear Treaty, an impressive step given the context of the Cold War. 5
Thus, the Arctic became distinguished as a region of extraordinary cooperation as the Cold War
came to a close. Gorbachev furthered this by using Reykjavik and Murmansk to host olive
branch meetings with Western leaders in 1986 and 1987 and to call for more regional
cooperation.6 His 1987 Murmansk speech outlined six Soviet priorities 3 in the Arctic and stated
that it was time to make the Arctic a “zone of peace.”7 Among the six priorities, one was to
cooperate on environmental protections and specifically to create a forum to create a
comprehensive plan for protecting the natural environment of the north. 8 Another was the
development of an Arctic Research Council, which included specific considerations for the
interests and needs of Indigenous residents and communities in the North. 9
Following Gorbachev’s speech, in 1991 Finland, with significant support from Canada,
initiated the Rovaniemi process to develop the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)
with the seven other Arctic States.10 Indigenous groups were not included in this forum, despite
2

The US even had a military base in Greenland which continues to feature in security politics.
These six priorities were:
1. A nuclear free zone in Northern Europe/the Arctic.
2. Downscale military activity and restrict on naval and air force operations in the region.
3. Peaceful cooperation on the exploration and development of energy resources in the North.
4. Organization and cooperation in science in the region, perhaps creating an Arctic Research Council
and conference on Arctic scientific research.
5. Cooperation on environmental protections and development of a comprehensive plan for
environmental protections, management, and joint collaboration.
6. Opening the Northern Sea Route.
(Gorbachev, M., 1987, “The Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of
the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk.” (Novosti Press Agency: Moscow, October 1,
1987), pp. 23-31.)
3
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Gorbachev’s recognition of their role in the region. 11 As a result, Indigenous leaders in the
Arctic—in particular, Mary Simon of the the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)—advocated for
inclusion and recognition of Indigenous voices and interests with the increased cooperation and
attention in the Arctic.12 Thus, Arctic nations began to explore the idea of creating a multilateral
forum beyond AEPS to handle Arctic issues, eventually creating the Arctic Council through the
1996 Ottawa Declaration. 13
The Arctic Council is a less formal body, in a legal sense, than many other international
institutions. Rather than creating treaties or legal obligations, the Council focuses on making
recommendations and adopting reports to contribute to the development of norms to guide Arctic
actors and international environmental policy creation.14 This soft-law approach was necessary to
convince key players like the US to join. 15
The Arctic Council is made up of the eight Arctic states discussed in this paper—the US,
Canada, Russia, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Greenland/Denmark, and Iceland—who are voting
members.16 There are six Indigenous groups who act as Permanent Participants and numerous
observer members as well, including thirteen non-Arctic states, NGOs, and other international
institutions. One notable observer is China. 17 The Permanent Participants are the Aleut
International Association (AIA), the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), the Gwich’in Council
International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council. 18 According to the Ottawa Declaration,
the Permanent Participants have rights to “active participation and full consultation [in
connection with the Council’s negotiations and decisions].”19 In practice, this means that the
Indigenous groups have the ability to voice their opinions, yet they cannot vote in Arctic Council
ministerial meetings. However, their power has been described as a “de facto vote” because,
according to Shadian and Gamble, “while the Permanent Participants are unable to break
consensus and keep an initiative from moving forward there has yet to be an occasion when one
or more of the Permanent Participants has serious reservations about an initiative before the
Arctic Council that was not, at least, discussed in an attempt to resolve these concerns.” 20
The structure of the Arctic Council is broken into six working groups: the Arctic
Contaminants Action Program, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, the
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response,
the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, and the Sustainable Development Working
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Group.21 Indigenous issues are discussed in many of these different working groups and there is
also an Indigenous Permanent Secretariat tasked with managing Indigenous affairs in the
Council.22
There are strengths in the Arctic Council, including the flexibility of its soft-law
resolutions and the unique ability of the Council to incorporate non-traditional sovereignty into
international governance and generate collaboration, cooperation, and innovation among Arctic
stakeholders, However, there are also important limitations on Indigenous representation. First,
there is the lack of international legal personality, or in other words, the non-binding nature of
the Council’s resolutions. This detracts from the strength of its work which disproportionately
impacts the Indigenous groups as the Arctic Council is the primary body they have for advocacy
and representation due to the exclusionary nature of other traditional, state-sovereignty based
bodies (like the IMO, UN, NATO).23 It is also argued that despite the ‘de facto vote’ of
Permanent Participants, there is still a visible power hierarchy that constrains their efforts at
expressing non-traditional sovereignty. As tensions rise over issues such as shipping, off-shore
drilling, pollution, and security, more observer states join, and the forum increasingly reaches
into the arena of high politics, the Council is becoming even more state-centric/state-power
centralized and thus potentially further weakening the relative strength of Indigenous
representation and diluting their voices. 24
The structure of the Arctic Council also contributes to a lack of enforcement capability
and accountability. Since the Council does not have a regulatory body, they depend upon states
to implement their declarations and recommendations. Many of these Arctic states do not
actually support substantive Indigenous rights. 25’26 Canada, the US, and Russia—the three major
superpowers in the Arctic—have all failed to ratify UNDRIP. Indigenous advocates from these
countries, including Russia and the US, have expressed concerns about the extent to which
federal agencies and representatives, and even Permanent Participant representatives, consider
Indigenous interests.27’28 Thus, this lack of enforcement capability impacts the efficacy of
initiatives and disproportionately so for ones that are focused on Indigenous rights or are
important for the advancement of Indigenous interests.
Due to the structure of the Arctic Council, with many working groups and a rotating
chairmanship, it is difficult to keep track of the many projects, initiatives, and efforts of the
Council which limits the effectiveness as well. 29 The Council started with around thirty projects
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but by 2015, there were over eighty projects. 4 As this number grows it becomes increasingly
challenging to manage, coordinate, and prioritize funding, particularly as funding is limited. 30
This problem is especially challenging for Indigenous groups because they are often dependent
on other sources for implementation and funding. 31 Even more, it is hard to identify priorities as
Arctic Council declarations require consensus and thus are often just broad and vague, while
working group recommendations are usually hyper-focused and extensive and often unrealistic. 32
Outside of the Arctic Council, the UN and the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) act as the
primary governing framework in Arctic. UNCLOS is widely acknowledged to be the dominant
legal framework governing sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Arctic and the five Arctic Coastal
states confirmed this with the 2008 Illulissat Agreement.33’34 Nearly every major nation in the
UN—including the Arctic nations—have signed and ratified UNCLOS.35 The exception to this is
the United States, which has signed the Agreement on Implementation but has not ratified the
treaty, although it has publicly stated that it follows the treaty as a matter of policy. 5’36
The US failure to ratify UNCLOS has implications in Arctic politics, specifically in
regard to jurisdiction, overlapping claims, and natural resources. Experts have argued that,
because the US is not party to the convention, it is putting US interests at stake because it lacks
clear treaty-based rights to defend them compared to the claims of Russia, Canada, and other
Arctic nations.37 For example, Canada, Russia, and Denmark have filed claims to territory off the
continental shelf of the seabed on their coastline extending to beneath the North Pole.38 If the
Convention approved these claims for any nation, they would be able to claim rights to an
Exclusive Economic Zone, giving them both seabed mineral rights and the ability to restrict
travel, shipping, and activity in the open water. 39 The US has publicly opposed these claims,
largely because they do not want their activity, industry, and economic interests in the region to

4

There is a tracker that was implemented under the Canadian chairmanship called the Amarok tool—it doesn’t
prioritize though, just tracks the ongoing work of the Council and Working Groups. (Ulmer, Fran, and David Balton.
2019. “A Strategic Plan for the Arctic Council: Recommendations for Moving Forward.” Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs and Wilson International Center for Scholars. 1-26.)
5
Originally in 1982, the US claimed UNCLOS gave too much power to communist nations—like the Soviet
Union—and did not ratify the treaty because they did not want to lose sovereignty or jeopardize their authority and
jurisdiction at sea. After the 90s and the end of the Cold War, the US convinced the convention to make changes to
the treaty to appease their worries about the power of nations like Russia, the US still failed to ratify it, supposedly
over concerns from the Reagan administration about the rules on deep seabed mining. In 2004, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee unanimously recommended ratifying UNCLOS but no action was taken and the US has still
failed to ratify the Convention. (Schrepferman, W., 2019. “Hypocri-sea: The United States’ Failure to Join the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Harvard International Review)
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be limited.40 But, because the US has not ratified the treaty and not submitted claims of its own,
its does not have a formal legal basis for its opposition.41 In addition, while UNCLOS empowers
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to review the submitted claims of
nations and make recommendations, the CLCS cannot make a determination when there are
overlapping claims, like there are in the Arctic. 42 Instead, nations must compromise and find a
resolution together, proving that UNCLOS cannot serve as the decisive governing framework in
the Arctic.43 Further, with the influx of claims from nations around the globe, it is estimated it
will take over two decades for UNCLOS to settle the current workload, thus leaving decades of
continued tension and conflict over Arctic resources and sovereignty. 44
Outside of these claims and jurisdictional issues, UNCLOS has specific provisions
related to the Arctic. In negotiations on the treaty, Canada, the US, and Russia requested that
attention be granted to the Arctic sea, eventually creating an “Arctic Deal” which led to the
inclusion of Article 234.45’46 The Article is focused on preventing marine pollution and states
that ice-covered waters anywhere in the world are subject to a special legal regime which permits
coastal states in those regions to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws for vessels traversing
these ice-covered areas within their exclusive economic zones.47 This Article lacks in specificity;
in particular, the clause about “ice-covered waters” is up for interpretation and shifting with the
onset of climate change.48’49 UNCLOS uses words and phrases like “particularly severe climatic
conditions,” “most of the year,” and “obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation,” which
can all be interpreted differently depending on the priority of the nation. 50 For example, Canada
and Russia have used Article in 234 as part of their defense for holding sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, respectively, which could be further jeopardized
by the melting and thus un-ice-covering of the region.51
Climate change could also impact the status of current continental shelf claims in the
Arctic by opening up the region for more data collection and mapping. 52 Canada, Russia,
Norway, Iceland, and Denmark have submitted their UNCLOS claims, but only Norway and
Iceland have received their recommendations from the CLCS and the overlapping claims of
other three remain undecided. 53 And, even though the decisions made by the CLCS are
considered binding international law and their recommendations are expected to be implemented
by states, if ice were to melt and new geological and hydrographical data were to be collected,
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even these finalized claims could potentially be reconsidered, thus returning to a state of
uncertainty in Arctic jurisdictions. 54
As is clear, UNCLOS is binding international treaty law which means all the signatories
are nation-states; no independent Indigenous groups or representatives can be party to the
Convention. As a result, there is an absence of a direct Indigenous voice in these important
discussions surrounding Arctic governance, natural resource and extractive policy, and
sovereignty in the region. Critics argue that this structure reinforces the traditional Westphalian
concept of sovereignty in statehood which weakens Indigenous efforts at self-determination.55
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) also has legal and political authority in
the Arctic and issued a Polar Code in 2017. 56 The Polar Code includes provisions to control the
hazards of navigation in the region and to protect the safety of crews and search and rescue for
ships while traveling.57 It also includes provisions addressing the growing environmental
concerns over increased shipping in the Arctic by regulating ship designs and limiting the
discharge of oil, chemicals, sewage, and garbage. 58
While this agreement was considered by many to be a milestone achievement for the
IMO, critics pointed out the glaring gaps in the Code.59 For example, there is no regulation of
heavy fuel oil (HFO) which is used by cargo vessels, cruise ships, and bulk carriers (all ships
traversing the Arctic Sea), and which would have catastrophic environmental effects if a spill
were to occur.6’60 Invasive species, underwater noise, grey-water discharges, and emissions from
ships are all issues that the IMO Polar Code neglects to address but which are also all relevant to
Indigenous rights in the Arctic. 61 While not related directly to extraction, these issues impact the
ability of Indigenous peoples to exercise self-determination over their lands, resources, and
waters. In addition, it was not until 2016 that the IMO directly interacted with Arctic Indigenous
groups7 which further highlights the systemic exclusion of Arctic Indigenous peoples despite

6

The shipmasters were encouraged to refrain from using heavy fuel oil because of the danger it poses in the Arctic,
but in 2015, the majority of the fuel consumed in the region was HFO, which suggests this recommendation is not
being heeded. In contrast, there is a ban on HFO use in the Antarctic based on similar environmental concerns
regarding the fragility of polar ecosystems and immense risk posed by of HFO use. (Schopmans, H., 2019,
“Revisiting the Polar Code: Where Do We Stand?” The Arctic Institute.)
7
This interaction also only occurred because the World Wildlife Fund invited a delegation of Arctic Indigenous
peoples and they are only able to attend as observers through accredited NGO organizations. (Khan, H. A., 2020.
“Chapter 5: Legally Sculpting a Melting Arctic: States, Indigenous Peoples and Justice in Multilateralism.” In
Changing Actors in International Law. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, pg. 149.)
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knowledge and recognition that these issues and discussions deeply impact Arctic Indigenous
lives.62
The holes in these structures—the Arctic Council, UNCLOS, and the IMO Polar Code—
all point to the gaps in the legal regimes in the Arctic and reflect the fact that there is still no
foundational, codified, binding law that can be used to govern Arctic affairs.63 With no real legal
authority, Arctic residents and the Council in particular, are dependent on states to implement,
enforce, and ultimately determine the role of various Arctic policies and norms. This weakens
the potential influence of international standard-setting and the Council on a regional and global
level.
On the other hand, these international institutions and agreements have power both
through governing authority and as a result of their reputation and status on the global stage and
thus their policies and attitudes still have a strong impact at national and subnational levels
through the theories of diffusion discussed earlier in this paper. Further, the ICC’s declaration on
Inuit sovereignty in the Arctic notes how the Arctic Council and other regional institutions that
bring together Arctic nations, other states and organizations, and Arctic Indigenous peoples can
act as effective mechanisms for international exchange and cooperation.
Another relevant example of this diffusion in the Arctic surrounds the growth and
evolution of impact benefit agreements (IBAs) between Indigenous communities and extractive
actors. Extractive projects are often viewed as “hyper-localized legal spaces” because they have
project-specific regulations and distinctive plans dependent on the operation, company, and
people involved.64 There are also national and regional laws governing IBAs—found in statutory
policy, constitutions, regulatory limitations, or case law.65 These agreements are also framed
largely as private agreements, although they still hold public value and are subject to public
perceptions, and this mix of public and private law and politics contributes to legal diffusion and
policy evolution.66
For example, the Ekati Environmental Agreement is often considered to be a
foundational case for the growth of IBAs in Canada and globally. 67 The Ekati Mine began in
1997 and was Canada’s first diamond mine. 68 As a result, there were few regulatory or legal
systems in place to manage the development and so the project agreement was based on
negotiations and consultation. 69 The Ekati Environmental Agreement attempted to fill in the
holes left by the relative lack of regulatory presence and thus any obligation, expectation, or
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concern that lacked another legal setting was included in the Agreement. 70 Specifically, the Ekati
Environmental Agreement included four Indigenous groups as signatories to an implementation
protocol which involved creating a monitoring group to oversee the mine with their participation
and representation.71 The Federal Minister of Indian Affairs set the timelines for the IBA
agreements between these Indigenous groups and the mine. 72 This Agreement created a
contractual precedent for future projects in the region and set a standard for industry negotiation
and consultation, basically acting as a template for extractive development in the Canadian
Arctic.73 The Ekati agreement and related diamond mining IBAs in the Northern Canadian
region are often heralded for these successes, yet Indigenous voices from the area also expressed
frustration over the real power and implementation of the clauses in the agreements. For
example, some have said that there is no enforcement power because there is no government
really overseeing the project and the monitoring group acts more as an auditing or oversight
mechanism rather than being actively involved in the regulatory process.74
Despite the shortcomings in the agreement, Indigenous advocacy groups used the Ekati
case as a model to push for increased consultation, negotiations, and rights in the extractive
process and industry actors used the Ekati case as evidence of their ethical and responsible
practices.75 They brought the Ekati model to an international setting and helped popularize this
model of using IBAs to fill regulatory gaps. 76
Since the Ekati case, Indigenous advocates, industry actors, and policy-makers have
continued to analyze and evolve IBAs and the idea of benefit sharing across the globe. They
utilize legislative processes, court systems, international institutions, like the Arctic Council, and
public and economic pressure on corporations to impact policy and industry standards. Some
version of the IBA now exists in nearly all, if not all, extractive developments on Indigenous
territory.77’78 Examples of specific mechanisms for supporting and enforcing IBAs in the Arctic
include: UNDRIP, the Arctic Council’s Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative, and the lending policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank (WB) among other financial institutions.79 These mechanisms include binding
and enforceable policy, like the lending and investment rules from major banks, and declaratory
recommendations that can be used in advocacy and as political pressure. 80
Despite the proliferation and diffusion of benefit sharing and IBAs in the Arctic, there is
a significant amount of variability between agreements and processes, largely because there are
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no clearly outlined universal and enforceable standards or policies in the Arctic or globally. 8’81
The trend in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and Environmental, Social, Governance
(ESG) investing mean that benefit sharing, specifically in a transnational context, will continue,
yet there remain uncertainties and major areas for improvement in the process in order to more
fully support Indigenous rights to self-determination over land and natural resources. 82 One piece
of this discussion needs to examine the most effective way to do a cost-benefit analysis when not
every factor in the equation has a clearly identifiable and quantifiable value. In other words, the
traditional metric system for evaluating costs and benefits is insufficient because they are values
that cannot be monetized—how do you put a cost on the spiritual and cultural value of lands to
Indigenous peoples, how do you assign a dollar amount to the concept of generational equity?
There are experts 83 researching how to evaluate ecosystem values from a holistic and progressive
perspective, yet these tools are not widely used or applied and this valuation system will need to
advance before benefit sharing and ESG/CSR are able to have a truly meaningful role in
supporting and advancing Indigenous rights.
The matters discussed in these two chapters demonstrate the conflicting frames and
perspectives on Arctic priorities and issues. They highlight how complex the region is,
particularly in regard to discussion of natural resources and Indigenous rights. They raise
important questions that will need to be addressed in the coming decades. First, how can Arctic
resources be used and the benefits shared with minimal impact to the lands, waters, animals, and
people? Second, how can this be done with consideration for the future—recognizing that many
of these resources are nonrenewable—and how can there be balance with renewable energy
development and support for other ecosystem services and values, including subsistence needs
and Indigenous rights to self-determination?
The great need for economic growth in much of the Arctic—in income, jobs,
infrastructure, and market diversification—further complicates sustainable development. Even
more, rapid climate change and the extreme uncertainties associated with the warming planet
also play a vital role as people question whether any development is responsible or sustainable,
and in particular, if further fossil fuel development can be justified. This balance between
8

This variability is highly influenced by national policies and attitudes and it should be unsurprising that Canada has
much more developed and enforced standards on IBAs with Indigenous groups than Russia. (Tsyiachniouk, M.,
Henry, L., Lamers, M., van Tatenhove, J. P.M., 2018, “Oil and Indigenous People in Sub-Arctic Russia: Rethinking
Equity and Governance in Benefit Sharing Agreements.” Energy Research and Social Science 37.)
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resource development and protection is inherent to Arctic politics and is increasingly critical to
the future of the region—for the environment, people, and politics. Yet, as is evidenced
throughout this paper, the debate is often controversial because there are many actors with varied
interests and everyone fears that over-prioritization of one side will “endanger” the “continued
well-being” of the Arctic.84 As the Arctic grows in complexity and geopolitical significance,
these tensions will rise and put further strain on the current collaborative nature of Arctic affairs.
We will need to figure out how to adapt and use the legal, political, and cultural foundations we
currently have to create novel and creative solutions to the problems facing the Arctic and the
globe.
1

“Arctic Climate Change Update 2021: Key Trends and Impacts.” A summary for policy-makers from the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Working Group of the Arctic Council, 2021.
2
English, J., “The Emergence of an Arctic Council.” Chp. 10 in Governing the North American Arctic: Sovereignty,
Security, and Institutions eds. Berry, D., Bowles, N., and Jones, H. (Palgrave Macmillan), pg. 217.
3
Peter, H., 2013, “Chapter 1: The International Political Wilderness.” In International Politics in the Arctic: Coming
in from the Cold. (Taylor & Francis Group), pg. 10-13.
4
Ibid, pg. 13.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Gorbachev, M., 1987, “The Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of
the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk.” (Novosti Press Agency: Moscow, October 1,
1987), pp. 23-31.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Elferink, A. O., 1992, “Laws of the Sea: Environmental Protection in the Arctic—The Rovaniemi Process.”
Marine Pollution Bulletin 24(3), pg. 128-130.
11
Ibid.
12
Simon, M., 2021, “Mary Simon, First Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials, 25th Anniversary interview - The
Inclusion of Indigenous Peoples.” The Arctic Council.
13
Ottawa Declaration, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/85
14
Wilson, P. 2016. “Society, steward or security actor? Three visions of the Arctic Council,” Cooperation and
Conflict 51 (1), pg. 57.
15
Elferink, A. O., 1992 “Environmental protection in the Arctic—The Rovaniemi process,” Marine
Pollution Bulletin, 24, 3, pg. 129.
16
https://arctic-council.org/en/
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ottawa Declaration, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/85
20
Gamble, J. and Shadian J.,. 2017. “One Arctic ... But Uneven Capacity: The Arctic Council Permanent
Participants.” In One Arctic: The Arctic Council and Circumpolar Goverance, eds. P. Whitney Lackenhauer,
Heather Nicol, and Wilfrid Greaves. Distributed by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee and the Centre on
Foreign Policy and Federalism, pg. 144.
21
Ottawa Declaration, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/85
22
https://arctic-council.org/en/about/permanent-participants/
23
Gamble, J. and Shadian J.,. 2017. “One Arctic ... But Uneven Capacity: The Arctic Council Permanent
Participants.” In One Arctic: The Arctic Council and Circumpolar Goverance, eds. P. Whitney Lackenhauer,
Heather Nicol, and Wilfrid Greaves. Distributed by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee and the Centre on
Foreign Policy and Federalism, pg. 146.

88

24

Ibid.
Exner-Pirot, Heather, Maria Ackrén, Natalia Loukacheva, Heather Nicol, Annika E. Nilsson, and Jennifer Spence.
2019. “Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council.” The Arctic Institute, Article in Law and Governance.
26 Sellheim N. 2019. “The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights.” In:
Sellheim N., Zaika Y., Kelman I. (eds) Arctic Triumph. Springer Polar Sciences. Springer, Cham.
27
Ibid.
28 “The Arctic Council: Perspectives on a Changing Arctic, The Council’s Work, and Key Challenges: A Joint
Memorandum of a Multilateral Audit on the Arctic States’ national authorities’ work with the Arctic Council.”
Conducted by the Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United
States of America, May 2015, 1-36.
29
Ulmer, Fran, and David Balton. 2019. “A Strategic Plan for the Arctic Council:
Recommendations for Moving Forward.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Wilson
International Center for Scholars. 1-26.
30 Sellheim N. 2019. “The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights.” In:
Sellheim N., Zaika Y., Kelman I. (eds) Arctic Triumph. Springer Polar Sciences. Springer, Cham.
31
Blahed, Hanna. 2018. “Indigenous peoples as political actors within the Arctic Council: A case study.” Umea
University, Department of Political Science. Pg. 39.
32 “The Arctic Council: Perspectives on a Changing Arctic, The Council’s Work, and Key Challenges: A Joint
Memorandum of a Multilateral Audit on the Arctic States’ national authorities’ work with the Arctic Council.”
Conducted by the Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United
States of America, May 2015, 1-36.
33
Davidson, S., “Chapter 9: New Ways to Break the Ice.” In Frontiers in International Environmental Law: Oceans
and Climate Challenges. (Brill/Nijhoff: March 2021).
34
“The Ilulissat Declaration.” Arctic Ocean Conference, May 2008.
35
Postler, A., 2020. “UNCLOS in the Arctic: A Treaty for Warmer Waters.” Georgetown Security Studies Review.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Kramer, A. E., 2016, “Russia Presents Revised Claim of Arctic Territory to the United Nations.” New York Times.
39
Schrepferman, W., 2019. “Hypocri-sea: The United States’ Failure to Join the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea.” Harvard International Review
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Wilson, P. 2016. “Society, steward or security actor? Three visions of the Arctic Council,” Cooperation and
Conflict 51 (1), pg. 65.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Postler, A., 2020. “UNCLOS in the Arctic: A Treaty for Warmer Waters.” Georgetown Security Studies Review.
46
“United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),” December 10,
1982, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
47
Postler, A., 2020. “UNCLOS in the Arctic: A Treaty for Warmer Waters.” Georgetown Security Studies Review.
48
Ibid.
49
“United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),” December 10, 1982, Article 234.
50
Postler, A., 2020. “UNCLOS in the Arctic: A Treaty for Warmer Waters.” Georgetown Security Studies Review.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Macklem, P. 2008. Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 30 Mich. J. Int'l L.
177.
56
Schopmans, H., 2019, “Revisiting the Polar Code: Where Do We Stand?” The Arctic Institute.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
25

89

62

Khan, H. A., 2020. “Chapter 5: Legally Sculpting a Melting Arctic: States, Indigenous Peoples and Justice in
Multilateralism.” In Changing Actors in International Law. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, pg. 149.
63
Wilson, P. 2016. “Society, steward or security actor? Three visions of the Arctic Council,” Cooperation and
Conflict 51 (1), pg. 65.
64
Affolder, N., 2018, “Looking for Law in Unusual Places: Cross-Border Diffusion of Environmental Norms.”
Transnational Environmental Law 7(3), pg. 431.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid, pg. 433.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Affolder, N., 2010, “Rethinking Environmental Contracting.” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 21, pg.
156.
72
Bielawski, E. 2003. “Rogue diamonds: Rush for Northern riches on Dene land.” Toronto, Ontario, Canada:
Douglas & McIntyre.
73
Affolder, N., 2018, “Looking for Law in Unusual Places: Cross-Border Diffusion of Environmental Norms.”
Transnational Environmental Law 7(3), pg. 433.
74
O’Reilly, K., & Eacott, E. May 1998. “Aboriginal peoples and impact and benefit agreements: Report of a
national workshop.” Yellowknife, Northwest Territories: Canadian Arctic Resource Committee.
75
Affolder, N., 2018, “Looking for Law in Unusual Places: Cross-Border Diffusion of Environmental Norms.”
Transnational Environmental Law 7(3), pg. 433.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Tsyiachniouk, M., Henry, L., Lamers, M., van Tatenhove, J. P.M., 2018, “Oil and Indigenous People in SubArctic Russia: Rethinking Equity and Governance in Benefit Sharing Agreements.” Energy Research and Social
Science 37.
79
Ibid, pg. 141.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid, pg. 147.
82
Ibid, pg. 140-152.
83
Sherrouse, B. C., Semmens, D. J., Clement, J. M., 2014, “An application of Social Values for Ecosystem Services
(SolVES) to three national forests in Colorado and Wyoming.” Ecological Indicators, v. 36, p. 68-79.
84
Philip E. Steinberg, Jeremy Tasch, and Hannes Gerhardt. 2015. “Nature Reserve,” Chapter 7. In
Steinberg et al., Contesting the Arctic: Politics and Imaginaries in the Circumpolar North, London: I.B. Tauris, pg.
143.

90

Chapter 4
An Analysis of the Future: Proposals and Conclusions
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The past three chapters have explored the current state of Indigenous rights in the
Arctic, with a focus on extractive industry. They have discussed the laws, standards, and
relevant policies in Indigenous rights from the international level down to the local. Each
chapter has provided important context for understanding what Indigenous rights are in
theory and how they are, or are not, recognized in reality. The major conclusion of these
chapters is that on the international scale, and specifically within the Arctic, Indigenous
rights in extractive industry, though complex, are lacking.
Locally, Indigenous rights are dependent upon the laws and policies of specific
governmental regimes and extractive projects. Similarly, on a national scale, Indigenous
rights vary greatly between Arctic nations and the jurisdictional system in which they are
located. Internationally, Indigenous rights lack both a strong legal foundation and
implementation mechanisms through which to ensure protections, and as a result, there are
many disparate routes through which Indigenous groups have attempted to exercise selfdetermination in the past.
This conclusion raises the final question of this paper—what next? How can we move
forward? What direction might hold the greatest potential to enhance Indigenous rights by
clarifying and solidifying the legal rights Indigenous people enjoy across various levels of
governance in the Arctic, and ultimately, on international level?
There are many mechanisms through which Indigenous rights have been exercised in
the past are exercised now. There are many different ways to promote their future
development. This chapter will explore my proposed pathway forward for the advancement of
Indigenous rights in the Arctic, evaluating the future viability of previously options and
making judgements on the advantages and limitations of each one, and concluding with a
discussion regarding legal and political diffusion and the potential international implications
of these routes. Following my proposal, the options are organized into four categories:
international human rights law, existing regional systems, and transnational corporate
responsibility and contract law. 1

1

I also want to reiterate that as a white, non-Indigenous student, I do not have the answers or the authority to make
judgements on either what Indigenous self-determination means and looks like or what is the best way to promote
and advance Indigenous rights. I am merely attempting to contribute to the protection and expansion of Indigenous
rights and to help amplify and support Indigenous voices in this process.
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* * *
My Proposal
Pervasive throughout this entire paper is the idea that Indigenous self-determination
must be viewed from a holistic perspective—both in the rights themselves and in how they
are implemented and exercised. As a result, there is no single solution or proposal that will
advance Indigenous rights to the fullest extent or overcome all of the barriers and flaws
present in the current system. In order to promote Indigenous self-determination both on a
regional Arctic level or an international scale, I propose a combination of various proposals
and approaches based predominantly on the theory of international diffusion and
transnational flow. I see a need for a multi-faceted approach that utilizes both hard and softlaw approaches and roots in various governmental levels from local and tribal municipalities
to international institutions. Rather than attempting to achieve a single defined legal standard
for Indigenous rights, I view normative development the most promising pathway forward. I
think pattern solidification and the enforcement of a framework of best practices that allows
autonomy for states and upholds Indigenous rights offers the most potential for future
success.
The first strategy I propose is to take advantage of the Arctic Council and the
opportunity to promote non-traditional sovereignty in a governing arena. The Arctic Council
already acts as a good foundation for normative progress for Indigenous rights and there is
great potential for the organization to further the advancement of Indigenous rights. This
proposal for Arctic Council based evolution focuses on the short-term and on Arctic-level
change, although there are longer-term and broader international norm development
implications that will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter. I propose a rule change
that allows Permanent Participants to vote in the Arctic Council. This first step would give
Indigenous groups equal authority in the region and allow them to feel fully equal to states.
This shift would give Indigenous peoples a more meaningful role in Arctic affairs and make
a statement as to how Indigenous voices should be recognized and valued in the Arctic,
domestically and internationally.
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One limitation in this first step is the fact that these Indigenous groups are not always
perfect representatives of Indigenous interests according to Indigenous advocates. RAIPON has
been accused of acting as an agent of the Russian state and thus not accurately representing the
voices of the Russian Arctic Indigenous peoples, particularly in issues over natural resources,
extraction, and development.1 This critique of RAIPON is important and it is critical to reflect
both upon what is meaningful representation and what is superficial, and on how to vet the
credentials of Indigenous representatives. Despite this, the majority of Indigenous groups in the
Arctic have been applauded for their work and their platform should not be reduced due to
Russian-induced limitations.
The second step in my overall proposal piggybacks on the equalization approach
mentioned later on in this chapter. The first part of the equalization approach is the inclusion
of a minimum standard for Indigenous rights as a condition precedent in investor agreements
in the Arctic where Indigenous peoples or lands are involved and the creation of a body to
ensure the enforcement of these standards. 2 This body could be within the Arctic Council or a
separate regional institution. The second part of the approach is that Indigenous groups are
expressly allowed to submit evidence and argument to their claims of mistreatment and
noncompliance from corporations or the state to the body.3 In order to counter the barriers to
successful implementation of this proposal (namely transnational corporations and states not
submitting to the idea), I suggest making a binding treaty in the Arctic Council that requires
all extractive developments in the Arctic, particularly those that are transnational, to include
these two conditions in their investment agreements/IBAs. The Arctic Council has already
passed several binding initiatives and they could require any state who wants to be involved in
the organization—whether as a full member (like the US and Russia) or as observers (like
China)—to sign and follow the treaty. As discussed briefly in chapter three, in order to
counter barriers to the funding of enforcement, the Council could institute a membership fee
and use this money to fund implementation and enforcement. There is already significant
pressure from the public in the US and Canada to make better and more informed and
climate-aware decisions in the Arctic2 and this momentum could be capitalized upon to

2

There have been multiple statements from major banking corporations and global lenders that they won’t provide
project-specific financial services for oil and gas-related activities in the Arctic Circle (more than two dozen
international banks and 5 of the 6 major US banks). The commitment is based on net-zero carbon emission goals
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solidify the place of Indigenous rights within the future of Arctic extraction.
The third step in my larger proposal is convincing the United States to sign, ratify, and
pass legislation enforcing UNDRIP. Regardless of the fact that the US states that the legal
framework has authority, ethical persuasion, and has set norms in international law, the US
not fully recognizing the legal precedents weakens the force of the doctrine. The US
acknowledging and reinforcing the precedents set by UNDRIP would be a significant step
towards further solidification and enforcement of Indigenous rights and self-determination. I
suggest investing in public advocacy and action from epistemic communities in order to
persuade the US to take this steps. Indigenous communities have achieved numerous
successes in promoting and protecting their own rights and utilizing this background and
expertise in activism, in combination with support and pressure from the general public
would be a strong motivator in pushing action upon the part of the US government—
particularly within a democratic administration. With the US as a reinforcing power behind
UNDRIP, the Declaration would have even more standing in international law and this raise
in status would contribute to further diffusion and implementation of these ideals.
The last step in my proposal involves investing in local Indigenous communities with
the intention of building capacity and helping empower Indigenous voices in local, national,
regional Arctic, and international arenas. As noted in chapter three, one problem in the
effectiveness of the Arctic Council in supporting Indigenous self-determination has been the
relative lack of resources in Indigenous communities so that it is difficult to find and fund
advocates and initiatives. 4 The Arctic Nations—particularly the US, Canada, Norway,
Finland, and Sweden—could all direct specific funds towards Arctic Indigenous nations to
be spent on capacity-building in any way they see fit. This could mean education and
training initiatives (ie. sending young Indigenous students to study law, policy, or science in
order to supplement their Indigenous Knowledge). This money could also be spent on
employing Indigenous community members to act as liaisons and advocates in the extractive
industry (ie. paying them as negotiators for contracts and IBAs). On the other hand, these
funds could go towards community initiatives on food security, mental health, renewable
energy development, or supporting Indigenous women—in any way the funds are

that many large banking corporations have begun to incorporate. (Saminather, Nichola. “TD Bank says it will not
finance oil and gas activities in the Arctic.” Reuters. November 9 th, 2020.)
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meaningful to the community, these benefits will funnel up to strength at other levels.
This proposal is a multi-faceted combination of hard and soft law, theories of
governance and social change, and international and locally based policies. It takes a holistic
approach with the goal of encouraging the international development of a legal and social
pattern for Indigenous rights, in other words, the evolution and enforcement of norms
supporting and advancing Indigenous self-determination. Theorists and scholars have
advocated for numerous other proposals and this chapter explores a few of these options
more in depth with the hopes of providing a well-rounded discussion on the progression of
Indigenous rights. A few of these proposals inspire components of the strategy I put forth
above and the analysis of their specific limitations and advantages provides context to how I
developed my proposal. These next options are organized into three categories: international
human rights law, existing regional systems, and transnational corporate responsibility and
contract law, with a concluding section on legal and political diffusion and potential
implications of this normative development in the Arctic on the rest of the globe.
* * *
International Human Rights Law: The Enforcement of UNDRIP
In chapter one, the connection between international human rights law and Indigenous
rights was explored, particularly the role of Indigenous advocacy in the growth of the field
and the importance of UNDRIP as a legal foundation for Indigenous rights. Chapter one also
noted one of the major shortcomings of UNDRIP which is the fact that it is a nonbinding
declaration. At a basic level, the most straight-forward route towards the advancement and
protection of Indigenous rights in extractive industry in the Arctic and beyond is the
enforcement of UNDRIP.
In review, UNDRIP is comprised of 46 articles in total and largely fulfills Indigenous
requests to be recognized as peoples with rights of self-determination.56 This right is
enumerated in Article 3 and was included primarily due to Indigenous advocacy which
emphasized the role of ‘self-determination’ as the core foundational concept of Indigenous
rights as was discussed in chapter one. The document declares that Indigenous peoples have
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the right to be free from discrimination, as well as to be guaranteed the rights to enjoy and
practice their cultures, customs, religions, languages, and to develop and strengthen their
economics and social and political institutions and possess nationality.7 The document
addresses rights to land and resources and rights of consultation and consent in development
projects.8 Overall, UNDRIP works to express the rights that “constitute the minimum
standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the Indigenous peoples of the world”
(Article 43).9 There are other shortcomings in the document, as noted in chapter one, namely
the fact that of the meaning of “self-determination” was qualified so as not to intrude upon
the sovereignty of a state.
Implementation of UNDRIP requires states to ratify the declaration within their
national governance institutions and pass legislation implementing the provisions of the
declaration.10 This lack of international enforcement changes the nature of the declaration
significantly as it allows states to interpret the rules as they see fit. For example, in the US,
the State Department has said that although the document is non-binding, it maintains “moral
and political force,” which can be understood to mean that is has soft-law implications that
guide behavior, but it does not have the ability to drastically change or terminate state
practices.3’11 This attitude treats the provisions of UNDRIP as non-hard law norms and
relates to Slaughter’s theory of ‘international governance,’ which emphasizes that soft law
norms gradually and imperfectly “promote social change.”12
Thus, in order for UNDRIP to achieve its full potential as a legal foundation for
Indigenous rights on the international level, either the declaration needs to be amended to
become a binding and enforceable document or there needs to be a greater incentive for
and/or pressure on nation-states to ratify and enforce the document domestically. The first
option—to make UNDRIP legally binding with international compliance mechanisms—
would involve creating a dedicated supervisory structure and require that all signatories
enforce each article of the document. 13 This change would hopefully limit the
implementation gap that currently exists and not allow states to partially enforce UNDRIP. 14
Even more, it would equalize the norms at issue—Indigenous rights and extractive

3

In fact, Carpenter and Riley argue that the State Department’s focus as of 2014 was on identifying the US
programs that already comply with these UNDRIP standards, “rather than outlining areas for reform.”( Kristen A.
Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 215.)
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development standards—by making them both binding legal commitments instead of a
combination of legal, political, and economic commitments. 15
Changing UNDRIP to a hard-law document would not immediately solve the future of
Indigenous rights though and there are numerous limitations in this solution. First, even
when a document is binding, that does not ensure a commitment to enforcement from each
nation-state.16 Canada has ratified UNDRIP and passed federal legislation mandating the
articles of the document yet, as evidenced in chapter two, it does not always maintain these
protections and is not a perfect enforcer of UNDRIP norms.17 There would need to be an
extensive system to hold each nation and local unit accountable which creates another whole
set of complicated infrastructure and management demands.
Secondly, there are theoretical flaws in UNDRIP. In the process of approving
UNDRIP, the meaning of self-determination was qualified to ensure that it didn’t infringe
upon the sovereignty of states. Thus, the basis of the document—self-determination—is
fundamentally diminished and the hierarchy between states and Indigenous nations is
maintained.18 Further, it is not realistic to assume that simply changing the status of
UNDRIP to be legally-binding would suddenly equalize the nature of these commitments in
the eyes of nation-states.19 In other words, making UNDRIP law does not automatically raise
the nation’s level of commitment to Indigenous rights to be equal with their commitment to
economic growth, extraction, and industrial development.
To enhance the enforcement of UNDRIP could include the creation of a dedicated
international tribunal on Indigenous rights specifically or another true tribunal on human
rights more broadly. There is already a major proposal for a tribunal like this on business and
human rights from the Lawyers for Better Business organization. 20 Theoretically, a tribunal
would force states and transnational corporations to comply with international standards and
norms on Indigenous and human rights and thus solve UNDRIP’s enforceability problem. 21
There are a few problems with this proposal though; first, based on the principle of
arbitration, both parties would need to consent to use of the tribunal in settling disputes. 22
The LBB proposal claims this would not be large barrier. However, since there is not yet
currently sufficient pressure to convince transnational corporations and states to comply with
Indigenous and humans rights, how likely would these parties be to accept contractual terms
that require them to submit to a tribunal?23 Another limitation with the LBB proposal is that
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it doesn’t include any discussion of specific rights or matters relevant to Indigenous peoples,
just human rights more broadly.24 Thus, the proposal is not sufficient for the advancement
and protection of Indigenous rights because they should be seen as distinct from general
human rights. Nevertheless, this proposal still holds merit and could be a valuable part of a
wider, more holistic solution—like I propose—particularly if directed more specifically on
Indigenous rights.

Using Existing Regional Systems
There has been discussion of using regional humans rights systems—like the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights—to advance Indigenous rights.25 As is clear, this
approach is piecemeal, similar to the UNDRIP proposal above, a partial solution that has the
ability to make meaningful impacts on a regional scale which is important but not sufficient.
That said, regional humans rights systems may also serve as perfect starting points in the
diffusion of legal norms and standards on an international and regional scale. The various
cases discussed in chapter one provide a great example of how precedents set in one country
through a regional human rights system can then have a broader impact on the state of
Indigenous rights in a region and around the globe. The role of regional human rights
systems as a mechanism of diffusion will be discussed further in the diffusion section.
The use of regional human rights systems is particularly relevant in the Arctic given
the unique nature of the arena and the role of the Arctic Council in promoting cooperation,
collaboration, and norm development in the region. As discussed in chapter three, there are
numerous strengths and weaknesses to the Arctic Council and there is discussion about how
to make it a more effective mechanism for the advancement and protection of Indigenous
rights in extractive industry.
One potential change is making the Arctic Council a binding, hard-law, treaty-based
institution. The soft-law nature of the Council offers benefits in that it was necessary in the
process of formation, it is flexible and allows for non-traditional sovereignty and
participation of non-state actors, and there is less pushback on innovation and advocacy
because it is not legally binding. Yet, these strengths do not outweigh the fact that the Arctic
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Council is arguably too weak without a legal personality, it is not inclusive or global enough
in nature, and the restrictions on jurisdictional issues are too limiting. The Council “acts
merely as a facilitator” and “does not play a role in dispute settlement.”26 The ethically
binding nature of this system allows Arctic states to operate with independence at any point
and means that the Council is dependent on states to implement, enforce, and ultimately
determine the role of various Arctic policies and norms, which weakens the potential
influence of the Council on a regional and global level. 27
In addition, the Arctic Council’s isolated focus on environmental protection and
inability to take either a comprehensive approach to policy development or take on the
regulatory role of governments means that its current structure will not be able to achieve
holistic, and thus effective, policy solutions, particularly in the realm of protection of
Indigenous self-determination. It is becoming abundantly clear that the interconnected nature
of the environment (climate change and pollution/degradation), economics (extraction,
resources, and trade demand), global politics (including security), and Indigenous rights, all
require multilevel and multipronged adaptations and policy solutions. Thus, the Arctic
Council cannot effectively address these challenges with its current jurisdictional
limitations—specifically the prohibition on military and security matters—as it cannot offer
a comprehensive approach.
Critics argue that for all these reasons, the Arctic Council needs to change to become
more coordinated, comprehensive and stronger.28 This could involve reimagining the
structure of the Council by writing a binding treaty and making each Arctic nation and
Indigenous group a signatory to the agreement. There could be other binding instruments
introduced to the Council through Working Group initiatives or the Indigenous Peoples’
Secretariat in order to create a web of enforceable mechanisms. The Arctic Council could
also facilitate the development of other institutions in order to generate an interconnected
legal regime network within the Arctic. This could involve a council on military security in
the region, an international body focused specifically on extraction, and/or a council directed
at Indigenous interests and issues. These proposals offer opportunities to codify and solidify
Indigenous rights in the Arctic and internationally, but it is important to view them with
partial skepticism because institution-building has often involved the neglect and suppression
of Indigenous voices and could make the situation worse.
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There are also smaller-scale options to increase the effectiveness of the Arctic Council
in protecting and supporting Indigenous rights. One proposal involves the creation of an
Arctic Council Strategic Plan that clarifies the mandates and priorities of each Working
Group in order to better organize the entire system, channel responsibilities, and hold each
Working Group accountable. 29 Another option is to create a working group specifically on
Indigenous issues—this group would be led by Indigenous representatives and managed by
the IP Secretariat. 30 One initiative for this group would be to create an Arctic specific set of
Environmental and Social Governance (ESG) best practices and co-production standards and
standardize transboundary development policies and contract expectations.31 Another smaller
solution would be to mandate financial contributions from member states in the Council and
thus require economic buy-in from observer states.32 This idea is very feasible and could be
conducted on a sort of sliding-scale dependent on ability to contribute to create a reasonable
proportional contribution and would also require tracking the account of Council finances. 33
Outside of these focused solutions and proposals, one of the greatest strengths of the
Arctic Council in supporting the progression of Indigenous rights is its ability to be a
mechanism of diffusion and support norm development and evolution on an international
scale. This role will be further discussed in the implications and diffusion subsection.

Transnational Corporate Responsibility and Contract Law
Transnational corporations play a hugely important role in extraction in the Arctic and
across the world. Without them, extraction would not be such a massive industry, without
them, these resources would not be developed. In chapter two, each of the case studies
presented involves transnational corporations and chapter three explicitly discusses their role
in terms of impact benefit agreements (IBAs)/benefit sharing. These agreements, or
contracts, provide the foundation for further development of Indigenous rights in extractive
industry through standardization of legal language and corporate responsibility policies.
One proposal calls for an “equalization approach” which would work to balance the
power and incentives between Indigenous groups and corporations. The proposal has two
parts; the first is the inclusion of Indigenous rights as a condition precedent.34 In other words,
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in order for the corporation to act upon the rights afforded to them in the treaty—namely,
extractive exploration and development—they would need to meet a certain baseline
compliance with Indigenous rights throughout the process.35 If Indigenous parties thought
they failed to meet this minimum standard, they could submit claims to an arbitral tribunal
which would make a judgement on the actions of the corporation with enforceable rulings.36
This system would hopefully incentivize corporations to meet a minimum standards of
Indigenous rights in order to avoid going through the arbitral process. Currently, most
investment treaties are firmly pro-development/economic growth and prove state
prioritization of investors over Indigenous peoples.37 In this status quo, extractive
corporations are highly litigious and tend to take any challenges from states, or statesponsored groups, to court and they often win. 4
The second part of the proposal would allow Indigenous groups to submit evidence to
support their claims vs. the defendant corporation, rather than permitting the state to submit
all the evidence/arguments.38 In effect, they could refute the corporation’s claims of
adherence.39 Typically, states are responsible for providing the arguments for Indigenous
peoples by defending their challenges to corporate activity or as the home state. Often this
means that enforcement of Indigenous rights is left to these states, which have been
unreliable resources.40 There is a third option in the traditional arbitral system whereby
Indigenous groups can submit amici curiae briefs in a case in order to have their voice,
evidence, and argument heard, although somewhat less directly. This route for exercising or
supporting Indigenous rights is rare, but the 2009 case of Glamis Gold v. United States 5
provided an example of an Indigenous nation doing so.41 The court has the option not to
consider the evidence and arguments submitted through amici briefs though, and in this
proposal, the submitted arguments of the Indigenous parties would have to be considered in
the decision.42 New Zealand has instituted a system similar to this proposal, where their
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According to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), over one quarter of the cases
brought to them involved mining, oil, and gas companies, which is more any other economic sector. (The Double
Life of International Law: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industries, 129 Harvard L. Rev. 1755 (2016).)
5
The case involved a Canadian mining company, Glamis Gold, and the Quechan Indian Nation in California. The
company had asserted that NAFTA (specifically, regulations on backfilling and land grading near indigenous sacred
sites) allegedly interfered with their mining interests. The Quechan Indian Nation submitted an amicus brief
detailing their relevant Indigenous rights and arguing that the mining activities of Glamis Gold would affect practice
of those rights. (Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009)).
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investment agreements include an exception which states that they may take measures in
violation of agreement conditions, if those measures are for the protection of the Indigenous
Maori community in accordance with the Treaty of Waitangi. 43
The plausibility of convincing states to begin to include inclusion of this proposal in
their investor treaties is questionable though. States might be willing to go this route because
it provides an excuse for them in the conflict between Indigenous rights and investors by
setting the baseline and then lessening their role in the process.44 As with the other solutions,
there is still the problem to provides incentives to have these provisions included. It can be
argued that states would just refuse to take this step because they are already investorprioritizing bodies and this isn’t going to change dramatically because of one proposal. 45
They might be willing to include a minimum standard for Indigenous rights but it is also
clear that this minimum might be well below meaningful rights and self-determination for
Indigenous communities. Again, part of the argument depends on diffusion and the idea that
under the properties of the snowball effect, if one nation goes and then another and then
another, this precedent will become an international norm, particularly if these first nations
are global superpowers, like the US and Canada.

International Diffusion and International Implications: From the Arctic to a Global Scale
Each of the prior sections has transitioned into this discussion of legal diffusion and
norm development. In the discussion of human rights and UNDRIP, diffusion is particularly
relevant as a mechanism to spread Indigenous rights norms from regional human rights
bodies to an international setting. In relation to transnational corporations, diffusion exists as
a route by which this Indigenous rights-focused contract law might promulgate into the
international sphere and become normative in international law. This paper has also provided
a number of examples of the effective advancement of Indigenous rights through diffusion at
various levels—the Ekati Environmental Agreement, the Berger Inquiry and the Lands
Claims agreements of Canada, the work of the Arctic Council in creating regional norms and
standards with a soft-law approach. All this highlights how important the concept of
diffusion is in the advancement of Indigenous rights and the fact that solutions will not be as
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effective without a multi-pronged, holistic approach that includes legal proposals and
political theory applications.
There are three stages in the process of how policies, standards, and rights cane
become international law through diffusion. The first step is the original implementation of
the concept, the moment when the idea is first instituted in legal or political form. The next
step is the expansion of this policy to other levels and arenas—the actual diffusion of the
specific concept across platforms. The third and last step is the solidification of the idea as a
norm in international law.
The first step—the initial application of the norm—is a critical step in the process of
diffusion. This moment has been referenced in the earlier sections of this chapter when
discussing how to incentivize states, corporations, and other actors to actually comply with
Indigenous rights or submit themselves to authorities who would ensure they do (ie.
formalizing UNDRIP, the creation of and consent to an arbitral tribunal, language in
contracts and IBAs). Scholars argue that, in order for this moment to occur, there needs to be
a change from the status quo, in other words, there needs to be a new and distinct
motivation.46 Albaugh argues that “policies tend toward inertia” and that there needs to be
intentional action from “influence agents” in these arenas as a way to force a change in
mindset in policy and decision-makers.47 Thus, in order for any of these discussed initiatives
to be successful, there needs to be targeted action to influence the perspectives of people in
power.
At the heart of this argument is the idea that human agency plays a pivotal role in
norm development and diffusion, both the advocates influencing the policy-makers and the
policy-makers themselves and the decisions they make on state action.48 This idea relates
directly to Haas’s concept of epistemic communities—networks of professionals with
expertise, competence, and authority in a certain domain—and how significantly they can
influence the processes of norm creation and evolution.49 I think there are numerous
epistemic communities relevant to the discussion of Indigenous rights in extractive industry.
The foremost one is the Indigenous communities and Indigenous advocates themselves, who
hold the maximum level of expertise on these issues. This paper has noted how critical their
role was in the original birth of Indigenous rights and international human rights law and this
continues to be true in their position as the experts of what self-determination looks like and
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means and how extraction impacts their lives. There are numerous other non-state actors that
influence the birth of policies and may form epistemic communities, in particular, NGOs,
consumers, the broader public, scientists, and activists. Non-state actors play key roles, and
Liftin’s theory of ‘sovereignty bargains’ highlights how diffusion and norm development
provide a platform whereby non-state actors can have a voice and complicate the limited and
traditionally formal understandings of sovereignty.50
After these rights, concepts, and legal ideas are included on one level, the next step is
the expansion of these policies to other levels and arenas, diffusion across platforms. As
Gilardi states, the actions and behaviors of a nation or international organization influence
those of other nations and bodies.51 Thus, like a snowball on a hill, once one state or
institution has adopted a policy, it is more likely that another follow suit and then another
after that, and so on, until the policy becomes widespread enough to be considered an
international norm. In reality, the process itself is often highly complex with a web of states,
local governments, organizations, regional and international institutions, and other actors
each making their own decisions, on their own timelines, dependent upon a multitude of
distinct factors. Gilardi calls this transnational flow and there are multiple examples of this in
the Arctic. The Ekati Agreement, which can be considered the foundational case for the
development of IBAs both in Canada and globally, is one.52’53
The last step is widespread acceptance and compliance of an Indigenous rights
framework. Theorists have described this stage as the point at which these ideas become
imbedded patterns of international cooperation. 54 The proliferation of UNCLOS, and
specifically the US’s compliance with UNCLOS, illustrates this spread and shows how a
policy, standard, or law can become enforceable purely through the peer pressure to
cooperate. On a regional level, this is what the Arctic Council is trying to accomplish. The
Council produces reports, recommendations, and sets of standards that are intended to
persuade Arctic nations, and other states and organizations with Arctic interests, into
compliance. The Council’s efforts are sometimes effective and sometimes less so, as has
been discussed.
Full voting power for Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council would further the
idea that non-state actors can have formal legal influence and could act as the initiating
moment for recognition of non-traditional sovereignty and Indigenous voices in legal
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settings and thus lead to the process of norm development and solidification in international
law. Many other institutions and bodies allow Indigenous representatives as observers but
status as actual members, monetary support, and the ability to fully contribute to discussions
and decision-making would be a monumental shift in the international legal setting. The
ability of this move to incite widespread international change would be increased if Arctic
Council officials and state representatives were to publicly support the decision and
encourage other international institutions and influential bodies to include Indigenous groups
as full representatives, and not just observers, in their processes.
Similarly, the adoption of transnational investor agreement standards that prioritize
Indigenous rights in the Arctic has immense potential to catalyze international acceptance
and implementation of these standards. Due to the interconnected nature of transnational
industry and trade, the growing pressure of public consumers, and the presence of
international superpower nations in the Arctic, an effective and rational legal framework for
Indigenous rights within extraction could likely be adopted on global scale following this
development.
US commitment to the international enforcement and implementation of UNDRIP
would give the declaration even greater standing in international legal settings and solidify it
as a framework for Indigenous legal norms in global law. Meaningful and continued
investment in Indigenous communities in the Arctic would similarly not only help build
Indigenous power in local, national, and Arctic levels, but it would also grow the heighten
the influence of Indigenous voices in the wider international arena and provide ample
opportunity for the further advancement of Indigenous self-determination across the world.

Conclusion
My proposal entails concrete steps, legally and politically, on the part of governments
and state actors, and it also requires a theoretical shift and buy-in from the public and
decision-makers to reconceptualize our notions of sovereignty and support Indigenous selfdetermination. None of these proposals—alone or together—will provide a full and perfect
solution to the oppression of Indigenous peoples and their land rights. Nothing will ever be
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able to compensate for the legacy of colonization and the separation of Indigenous peoples
from their lands, waters, cultures, and homes. Yet, over the next fifty years, the need for a
holistic approach and mindset shift to address Indigenous self-determination will only
become greater as the climate crisis worsens and our energy demands grow. The importance
of the Arctic as a hotspot for climate change and a deep bed of resources—both renewable
and not—will become increasingly apparent and will put a spotlight on Indigenous
communities and how we as a world support, listen, and respond to their voices and calls for
self-determination.
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